Experiments show that MMAligner raises the average refusal rate on unsafe multimodal inputs to 99% with less than 2% utility degradation and minimal training data, substantially improving the safety-utility trade-off over existing baselines.
Abstract
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) often refuse unsafe text prompts yet generate harmful responses to semantically equivalent multimodal inputs. Existing defenses either rely on external guardrails, which add inference overhead without repairing intrinsic flaws, or safety fine-tuning, which treats alignment as black-box optimization and may sacrifice utility or require large multimodal datasets. To identify the cause of this safety disparity, we analyze MLLM representations geometrically. We find that safety mechanisms learned from text persist across modalities: a shared safety subspace and refusal boundary remain effective, and representations inside this boundary consistently trigger refusals. However, unsafe multimodal inputs undergo a representation shift that places most of them outside the boundary, allowing them to bypass the model's intrinsic safety mechanism. This indicates that multimodal safety degradation stems from representation misalignment rather than the absence of safety capability. Based on this finding, we propose MMAligner, a safeguarding method that calibrates unsafe multimodal representations into the pre-existing refusal region. MMAligner applies a hard lower bound to ensure refusal, a soft upper bound to avoid excessive modification, and a preservation objective for benign inputs. Experiments across multiple open-source MLLMs show that MMAligner raises the average refusal rate on unsafe multimodal inputs to 99% with less than 2% utility degradation and minimal training data, substantially improving the safety-utility trade-off over existing baselines. (*Due to the notification from arXiv,"The Abstract field cannot be longer than 1,920 characters", the Abstract that appeared is shortened.)
It is suggested that multimodal safety cannot be enforced reliably without modeling the requested operation, the visual target to which it applies, and the confidence of that grounding.
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