Experiments across three instruction-tuned models show that HiRoute achieves high safety rates across multiple safety benchmarks while preserving safe-response helpfulness, reducing over-refusal, and maintaining competitive performance on general-purpose tasks.
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to harmful requests and jailbreak attacks. Parameter-efficient safety alignment methods based on prompt tuning typically rely on a single global prompt or externally selected prompt modules. Such static designs struggle to maintain a cross-category safety boundary while generating constructive responses tailored to specific risks and avoiding over-refusal of benign inputs. To address these limitations, we propose HiRoute, an input-adaptive hierarchical prompt-tuning framework that separates category-agnostic safety control from category-specific response guidance. HiRoute first trains a lightweight hierarchical router on representations extracted from a frozen LLM to jointly detect harmful intent and predict multi-label risk scores. It then freezes both the backbone model and the router and uses preference optimization with alternating gradient updates to learn a shared coarse-grained prompt and a set of fine-grained prompt experts as continuous embeddings. At inference time, benign inputs bypass the safety branch, whereas risky inputs are processed using the shared prompt together with a router-weighted mixture of risk-specific prompt experts. Experiments across three instruction-tuned models show that HiRoute achieves high safety rates across multiple safety benchmarks while preserving safe-response helpfulness, reducing over-refusal, and maintaining competitive performance on general-purpose tasks.
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