MMJailBench is introduced, a factorized benchmark that systematically varies and combines these factors under controlled configurations, enabling fine-grained comparison and factor-level attribution and a modular multimodal jailbreak evaluation suite with full and lightweight configurations, multiple judge options, and multidimensional metrics, enabling reproducible, scalable, and cost-efficient multimodal jailbreak auditing.
Abstract
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet how different factors shape their jailbreak vulnerabilities remains poorly understood. Existing benchmarks often couple harmful intent, prompt framing, visual semantics, and instruction carrier within individual jailbreak instances, obscuring the specific sources of observed vulnerabilities. To address this limitation, we introduce MMJailBench, a factorized benchmark that systematically varies and combines these factors under controlled configurations, enabling fine-grained comparison and factor-level attribution. Large-scale evaluations across 16 open-weight and proprietary MLLMs reveal highly heterogeneous and model-dependent vulnerability profiles. Jailbreak vulnerability varies markedly across harm domains, exposing uneven coverage in current multimodal safety alignment. Prompt framing emerges as the dominant source of variation, task-relevant visual semantics systematically increase jailbreak susceptibility with authority-like cues exposing particularly pronounced vulnerabilities, and visually rendered instructions do not consistently increase jailbreak susceptibility relative to direct textual instructions. To further investigate the risks introduced by multimodal context, we conduct diagnostic analyses on a representative open-weight model and identify vulnerability-associated patterns in internal representations and cross-modal interactions. Finally, we develop a modular multimodal jailbreak evaluation suite with full and lightweight configurations, multiple judge options, and multidimensional metrics, enabling reproducible, scalable, and cost-efficient multimodal jailbreak auditing.
: Large language models are increasingly being deployed in safety-critical domains, yet remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety alignments. This systematic review synthesizes empirical jailbreak research published between 2024 and 2025, using a PRISMA-guided search protocol, followed by BERTopic-based topic modeling. The analysis identifies eight main jailbreak categories: optimization-based, ge-netic/evolutionary, iterative refinement, semantic/persuasion-based, decomposition, context/generation-level, visual/encoding and fuzzing attacks, and characterizes their effectiveness, efficiency, and transferability across open-source and proprietary models, including Llama-2/3, Vicuna, GPT-3.5/4, Claude, Gemini, and DeepSeek-V3. Results show that simple configuration and context-level attacks can match the near-perfect attack success rates of sophisticated white-box optimization methods on models such as Llama-2, while requiring far fewer queries and no parameter access, highlighting a gap between research focus and practical threat severity. The review further identifies five recurring vulnerability mechanisms: representation-level gaps, execution-priority manipulation, semantic fragmentation, gradient-space exploitation and persuasion susceptibility, and documents family-specific vulnerability patterns, with open-source Llama-based models consistently more exposed than safety-enhanced architectures such as Claude. Diverse methods, uneven focus on models and publication bias limit how broadly results apply. Nonetheless, the review reveals that weaknesses in safety alignment persist across successive LLM generations, urging that effective defenses must address all eight attack categories rather than isolated techniques.
Meda Račaitytė, Hélder Bastos, R. Ribeiro et al.· International Conference on...· 0 citations
This work proposes an explanation-aware safety framework that augments binary harmfulness detection with structured, human-interpretable explanations capturing severity, strategies, trigger spans, ratio-nales, and derived safety factors, and introduces a human–LLM hybrid annotation and canonicaliza-tion pipeline.
Sunghee Dong, Sungwon Yi, Kangmin Bae et al.· 0 citations
TanglishGuard is introduced, a novel benchmark designed to systematically assess the robustness of LLM safety mechanisms against code-mixed inputs and contributes to the development of more robust and equitable AI systems by ensuring safety mechanisms are tested against authentic communication patterns rather than sanitised English-only datasets.
Vivina Vijesh, Dr. E. Gothai, M. Student· International Journal of Inn...· 0 citations
As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) evolve into sophisticated interactive assistants, their reliability depends not only on following instructions but also on validating them. We define Proactive Critique as the model's autonomous ability to identify, analyze and fix faulty user inputs without extra prompts. However, evaluations mainly test models under ideal circumstances or simple refusal behaviors, largely ignoring active error processing. To fill this gap, we propose MMPCBench, a comprehensive framework for evaluating MLLMs'proactive critique competence. It features a fine-grained taxonomy of 4 primary error types spanning 12 subcategories, ranging from cross-modal contradictions to missing visual premises. We adopt a hierarchical evaluation protocol to measure models'error detection, diagnosis and resolution performance, and apply alignment-aware metrics to assess the coherence between internal reasoning and final responses. Tests on 14 mainstream MLLMs show obvious weaknesses in proactive critique, especially in dealing with subtle visual anomalies. Notably, we identify a pervasive"consistency gap": reasoning models can often correctly identify and analyze errors during internal reasoning yet suppress these valid insights in final outputs to prioritize response compliance. The code and data is available at https://github.com/ALIENS32/MMPCBench.
Jinzhe Li, Geng-Xu Li, Jinnan Li et al.· 0 citations
It is suggested that multimodal safety cannot be enforced reliably without modeling the requested operation, the visual target to which it applies, and the confidence of that grounding.
It is shown that English-only safety evaluations are insufficient; they require accounting for script family, perturbation type, and per-language alignment coverage, and a geometric mechanistic analysis of refusal failure across language tiers.
