Research on Green Technology Investment Strategies in Biodegradable Materials Supply Chain under Information Asymmetry

Abstract

Scientific design of patent licensing contract and sales channel selection are key to breaking the green technology promotion dilemma of biodegradable materials. Under market scale information asymmetry, we construct a three-echelon supply chain principal agent model including a patent technology supplier, a biodegradable material manufacturer and a terminal sales company. By comparing game equilibrium solutions when the terminal sales company chooses single channel or dual channel sales, we explore the optimal patent licensing contract design and channel selection strategy. We further compare the results with those under symmetric information, explore information value and discuss information disclosure strategy. The study shows that: Both the supplier and the company make strategic decisions on contract design and channel selection under information asymmetry. Reasonable matching of patent licensing contract and channel selection can effectively motivate the manufacturer to increase green technology investment and accelerate green technology diffusion in the supply chain. Information asymmetry deviates the supply chain from the optimal state. Internal information sharing negotiations can alleviate its negative impacts only when disclosure costs and benefits meet specific conditions. External government subsidies can significantly alleviate the negative impact and boost the manufacturer’s green technology investment. Market scale and consumer green preference coefficient have a synergistic effect on improving supply chain profit, consumer surplus and social welfare, and this effect becomes more significant when government subsidies are introduced.