Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are popular methods for empirically assessing the leakage of sensitive information in the training data through models or statistics learned from the data. The MI vulnerability is often evaluated through a binary classifier that tries to predict whether a particular sample was in the...
Joonas J\"alk\"o, Gauri Pradhan, Ossi R\"ais\"a et al.· 0 citations
Quantum key distribution (QKD) links are provisioned from security analyses of stationary channels, whereas the devices that determine the channel drift between recalibrations. Whether an eavesdropper who cannot alter the channel's own noise gains by following that drift has not been quantified. Adaptive eavesdropping...
Marcel Mordarski, Benjamin I. Gräs, A. Shehata et al.· 0 citations
With the increasing capabilities of Large-Language-Models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents, users are increasingly using them to solve everyday problems, such as answering e-mails or providing programming support. Existing work has extensively investigated security and privacy risks, such as prompt injections and the disclo...
Alessandro Pegoraro, Daryan Merx, P. Rieger et al.· 0 citations
Cyber attack agents are typically trained and evaluated within a single simulator, making it unclear whether learned policies transfer beyond the environments in which they were developed. This limitation hinders both deployment and fair comparison, as cyber simulators differ substantially in their state representation...
Sabrina Saika, Yinuo Du, Aritran Piplai· 0 citations
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Secure aggregation lets a server recover an aggregate of client updates without observing any individual update, but conventional protocols fix the aggregate precision when clients upload. We introduce and formulate a new progressive-resolution secure-aggregation functionality in which clients upload once and successiv...
Model quantization reduces the numerical precision of neural network weights and activations to lower storage and computational costs. Model inversion attacks recover or reconstruct sensitive training data or inference inputs from model outputs or intermediate features, so quantization may also alter their effectivenes...
Backdoor attacks can be implanted in Large Language Models (LLMs) during training, causing unwanted behaviour when a trigger appears in the input. Existing backdoor defences for LLMs attempt to remove the backdoor but inadvertently shift the model's output distribution to benign prompts, which can result in degraded mo...
Minoo Kim, Vasileios Lampos, George Drayson· 0 citations
Fine-tuning adapts aligned large language models (LLMs) to downstream tasks, but a few dozen harmful examples can remove their refusal of harmful requests. Prior work localizes safety-related behavior to specific layers, directions, and tokens, suggesting targets for protection. We test whether successful localization...
Jungseob Lee, Dongyub Jude Lee, Sugyeong Eo et al.· 0 citations
This paper presents a reproducible, educational study of evasion attacks in image classification and text classification. A compact convolutional network trained on MNIST reached 98.63% clean test accuracy and was evaluated under two white-box attacks. Under FGSM, accuracy fell to 60.20% at $\epsilon$ = 0.15 and 1.72%...
Parker Hummel (Minot State University), Ryne Skabo (Minot State University), Muhammad Abusaqer (Minot State University)· 0 citations
Can response safety be scored by cosine similarity to the mean embedding of known-safe responses? A recent sleeper-agent detector proposes exactly this score, yet the raw positive-centroid rule is not identified: positive observations locate the safe class relative to an encoder origin, but do not determine which direc...
As machine learning increasingly relies on public, untrusted data sources, data poisoning attacks, which inject malicious examples into training data to induce misclassification of a chosen target, pose a growing threat. Existing defenses either assume zero ground-truth information about which examples are poisoned, or...
Chaeeun Han, Soodeh Atefi, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik et al.· 0 citations
Most large language models (LLMs) run on external clouds: users send a prompt, pay for inference, and must trust that the remote GPU executes the LLM without any adversarial tampering. We critically ask how to achieve verifiable LLM inference, where a prover (the service) must convince a verifier (the client) that an i...
Oguzhan Baser, Elahe Sadeghi, Eric Wang et al.· 0 citations