Where recent studies report that probe-detected errors are resistant to interventions, it is found that in-context binding is a setting in which probes are actionable.
Abstract
A wrong answer does not show whether the model lacked the needed information or held it and failed to use it. On an entity-obligation binding task, a language model can emit an incorrect prompt-supplied binding while a linear probe can recover the correct one from its frozen hidden state. We measure how often this occurs across 16 public checkpoints, each evaluated with three seeds. We fit a probe on a training fold, select its layer on a validation fold, and report results on a disjoint test fold. On the trials each model gets wrong, probe accuracy exceeds the strict present-obligation baseline, 1/K = 0.125, by +0.196 (95% CI [+0.101, +0.296], bootstrapped over models). A query-entity counterfactual rules out token presence and recency. A score built from the sign of probe-output disagreement improves failure detection over the model's own confidence by +0.079 AUROC (95% CI [+0.036, +0.126]). Raw probe confidence gives no measurable improvement over model confidence. Steering the residual stream toward the probe-decoded binding, with no gold label, raises accuracy on all eight models tested by a mean of +0.168 (95% CI [+0.066, +0.280]). Where recent studies report that probe-detected errors are resistant to interventions, we find that in-context binding is a setting in which probes are actionable.
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Measuring false alarms on human-verified-correct ProcessBench traces with the present task held byte-identical, it is found that a completed audit ->repair episode already in the model's context lowers false alarms in 15 of 15 model x wording combinations.
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Vulnerability-detection benchmarks score the verdict an agent reaches, not the evidence it gathered. A model that recalls a CVE from pretraining therefore scores the same as one that traced the data flow. We study a task where this difference matters, deciding whether a commit introduces a vulnerability. Instead of sco...
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Agent harnesses record a failed tool call and its error message in the transcript and ask the model to continue, on the assumption that the error is corrective information, and it is found the gain is negative for every instruction-tuned model tested.
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