Capabilities, Human Nature, and Liberalism

Abstract

This paper reconstructs and addresses three major critiques of Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach (CA): (1) the claim that an exclusive focus on capabilities (rather than functioning) is ineffective in protecting people's well‐being; (2) the critique of paternalism; and (3) the objection according to which the CA relies on a vague notion of human nature. It argues that, while Nussbaum's account has the inner resources to partially address the objections, incorporating John Stuart Mill's harm principle offers a more robust defense of the CA. The paper contends that this liberal principle provides a sound criterion for distinguishing the human capabilities that merit political protection from those that do not. Moreover, the principle also allows the CA to better address the critiques of paternalism and laissez‐faire. After presenting this defense, the paper analyzes how the adoption of Mill's principle should shape the CA's treatment of self‐harm.