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A Levinasian Critique of Criterialism about Persons

2025 · Phenomenology and Mind · Vol 29, pp. 46 · 0 citations

Abstract

In post-Kantian metaphysics, several analytic thinkers argue that criterialism is both a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood. Criterialism contends that there is a specific subset of properties that determines someone’s personal identity, such as social reactive attitudes, mental complexity (second-order volition), value in combination with autonomy, self-consciousness, communication, and (practical) reason. However, Emmanuel Levinas, a prominent continental thinker, argues that behavioral properties are not tests for, but are parts of the ethical ideal of personhood. Levinas insists that the acceptance of others (as persons) cannot be a conclusion inferred from a test procedure; acceptance of others means precisely refusing to submit them to such tests. Personhood, therefore, depends on otherness. It is the other that shapes one’s identity as a person, and the infinite responsibility one has towards the other person calls for an ethical shift away from the subject and the categories of being.

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