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Pessimistic Meta-Induction and Its Limits: Lessons from Frequentist Statistics and Machine Learning Theory

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 28 references
Computer Science Mathematics

TL;DR

It is argued that ordinary enumerative induction can achieve everywhere convergence, whereas meta-induction fails even to achieve almost everywhere convergence, and no inference method whatsoever achieves almost everywhere convergence.

Abstract

This paper challenges the pessimistic meta-inductive argument against scientific realism by undermining its inductive step rather than its historical premise. Although related challenges already exist, I develop a new one. Drawing on a general epistemology of scientific inference developed in frequentist statistics, machine learning, and formal epistemology, I evaluate induction in terms of convergence to the truth. I argue that ordinary enumerative induction can achieve everywhere convergence, whereas meta-induction fails even to achieve almost everywhere convergence. Indeed, in the problem context where meta-induction arises, the failure is deeper: no inference method whatsoever achieves almost everywhere convergence.

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