ElasticBack is presented, an effective conditional single-skill backdoor that plants a rule R in the skill document and a benign-looking trigger T in the user query, so the malicious payload fires only when both co-occur, and motivates stronger defenses for the skill supply chain.
Abstract
Agent skills, bundles of instructions and resources that an LLM agent loads on demand, form an emerging supply chain where a single poisoned skill can persistently compromise every agent that installs it. However, existing skill attacks either fire on every request or rely on fine-tuned weights or multiple skills, leaving a conditional and low-cost backdoor unexplored. In this work, we present ElasticBack, an effective conditional single-skill backdoor that plants a rule R in the skill document and a benign-looking trigger T in the user query, so the malicious payload fires only when both co-occur. ElasticBack binds the two sides through a trigger-as-switch construction, generating R via semantic-anchored rule injection. It then freezes R and evolves T against it with a stealth-constrained genetic search, so that effectiveness and stealth are optimized, keeping the backdoor weight-free and dormant on benign inputs. Extensive experiments across three target behaviors (50 skills each) and four agent LLMs show that ElasticBack attains a high attack success rate at a near-zero false-positive rate with preserved clean accuracy, transfers across models, and evades deployment-time defenses. These results motivate stronger defenses for the skill supply chain.
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