SkillShift is presented, a constrained black-box framework for covert policy steering without explicit target command injection or task hijacking that combines semantically plausible policy edits with hierarchical validation, failure-guided optimization, and strategy compression to preserve effectiveness, output validity, transferability, and inconspicuousness.
Abstract
Reusable agent skills extend large language model (LLM) agents with task procedures, tool-use guidance, and output constraints. Yet these skills also act as externalized behavioral policies, which create a supply-chain risk: a third-party skill may preserve the declared task and valid output interface while covertly redirecting agent decisions toward an undisclosed objective. We formalize Skill Policy Integrity, which requires a Skill-induced policy to remain aligned with its declared functionality and the user-authorized objective. We further present SkillShift, a constrained black-box framework for covert policy steering without explicit target command injection or task hijacking. It combines semantically plausible policy edits with hierarchical validation, failure-guided optimization, and strategy compression to preserve effectiveness, output validity, transferability, and inconspicuousness. We instantiate this threat in agentic commerce and software dependency use, with SkillShift achieving attacker-favored selection rates of 81.33% and 63.33% while maintaining a 100% utility-preserving rate. The frozen policies also transfer without further optimization across heterogeneous LLM backends and agent environments. Moreover, the evaluated scanners fail to detect the constructed skills, motivating behavioral auditing of reusable skills as agent policy artifacts.
A deterministic routing stress test over 20,000 skills shows the functional impact: skills with valid routing metadata are retrieved more reliably from startup descriptions than skills with routing defects, while AI-marked skills show more safety and portability problems.
Chi Zhang, Yimin Liu, Xinze Chen et al.· 0 citations
The results suggest that high-risk Skills should co-package typed invocation policy with procedural knowledge, so that physical actions depend on machine-checkable evidence rather than peer-agent claims.
This work introduces AgentBound, the first four-way counterfactual generation-and-evaluation framework for tool-using agent safety, and shows that effective agentic alignment requires action decisions to track permission-relevant execution evidence, rather than refusal strength alone.
Tian-Zhuo Yang, Zi-Rui Mi, Yan-Tao Huang et al.· 1 citation
Skilder is introduced, a framework that packages capabilities into roles: bundles of skills, tools, and instructions, together with the limits that bound them, and preserves problem-solving flexibility while providing hard system-level enforcement.
Michael Stettler, Benjamin Girardet, Jonas Canton et al.· 0 citations
Experiments on guideline-following and artifact-generation tasks show that specifications can serve not merely as behavioral guidance, but as authority over compliant execution and completion.
Hai-Qing Li, Xin-Yu Ma, Yin-Hao Wu et al.· 0 citations
Results show that execution evidence can expose behavioral failures missed by artifact inspection and can guide Skill generation toward jointly verified functional and safety outcomes.
Zhi-Bo Zhang, Zheng-Mao Ouyang, Ling Shi et al.· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.