As generative AI tools find increasing use in research workflows, ongoing debates on their impact, appropriateness and responsible use have led policymakers to enact policies to disclose AI use at multiple publishing venues. However, are current AI disclosure policies and practices reflective of their purpose? In this work, we first investigate disclosure policies of top computer science venues and find that despite their prevalence, they remain highly under-specified. Secondly, through a survey of computer science researchers (N=$109$), we characterize the necessity of disclosures across different research tasks and levels of human involvement. We learn that researchers find disclosures most necessary for tasks involving research design, and for tasks when the human involvement is low. We also compile expectations that researchers have about the information to be conveyed in AI disclosure statements. Lastly, through an analysis of $13867$ disclosure statements from EMNLP $2025$ and ICLR $2026$, we reveal a large disconnect between these expectations and AI disclosures in practice---a prime example being writing assistance which is deemed less necessary but is frequently disclosed. We conclude with recommendations to align AI disclosure policies and practices with expectations, suggesting a categorization of research tasks by perceived necessity and a boilerplate template capturing expected details.
The adoption of generative artificial intelligence among communication practitioners and researchers surged after the launch of ChatGPT in November 2022, urging practitioners to critically engage in exploring pathways for fostering socially responsible and environmentally sustainable AI practices.
Clinical nurses' GenAI learning needs are currently oriented toward practical, application-focused skills, and curriculum development may benefit from a phased approach that prioritizes high-impact practical skills while progressively incorporating foundational, ethical, and advanced competencies.
Yeru Xia, Jingbang Liu, Kaili Wang et al.· Nurse Education Today· 1 citation· ⚡1
It is argued that both AI and bullshitters are untrustworthy informants, and for similar reasons, it is natural to describe AI’s informational outputs as bullshit, as it signals their distinctive kind of epistemic deficiencies, which they share with bullshit.
A new method for surgically removing training examples from a model reveals that as datasets grow, the link between what a model learns and what it produces dissolves.