How Much Do Circuits Tell Us? Measuring the Consistency and Specificity of Language Model Circuits

Abstract

The circuits framework in mechanistic interpretability aims to identify sparse subgraphs of model components that are causally responsible for a behavior, typically evaluated by measuring necessity and sufficiency. But these criteria say little about whether a circuit consistently captures how a model performs a task, or if it is specific to that task. We study these two properties, consistency and specificity, across six tasks and five models, extracting circuits at the component level (attention heads and MLP blocks) and at the level of individual MLP neurons. We find that component-level circuits are highly consistent and causally important on most tasks, but they are not specific: ablating one task's circuit damages another task's performance about as much as that task's own circuit does. Neuron-level circuits, on the other hand, exhibit higher task-specificity but are far less consistent within tasks. This is explained by circuit overlap: component-level circuits share most of their components across all task pairs, related or not, while neuron-level circuits overlap only between closely related tasks. In a case study of the components shared by the task circuits of Llama-3.2-3B, we show that they consist mostly of MLP blocks, while the few attention heads within turn out to be generic attention-sink heads. Overall, our findings raise questions about the degree to which circuits can support targeted understanding of, and intervention on, model behavior.