Oct 2026· Electronics· Vol 15, pp. 5032· 0 citations· 24 references
Abstract
Dynamic-language virtual machines store compiled functions as garbage-collected heap objects, yet embedded and field-programmable gate array (FPGA) integrity mechanisms check code only at load time or ignore whether memory holds live code. picoStella, a proof-of-concept FPGA-targeted virtual machine, reauthenticates live code in every garbage-collection pass: after marking, a verification pass uses the mark bits to re-hash each reachable function with SHA3-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 3) against a write-once trusted digest. The design passed 36 testbenches with identical results across two simulators, was synthesized for a Cyclone IV E FPGA, and its verifier was tested on a DE2-115 board. A closed-form model predicts per-function cost exactly; verification adds 167–8914% to the mark-sweep cost for up to eight 256-byte functions. Reusing the collector’s reachability saves 0.40% over a verifier with its own traversal, but up to 83% over a liveness-oblivious scrubber. Detection takes 42–314 cycles, all 5770 injected bytecode faults were detected, and board-level debug-register injection reproduced these latencies. On-chip clock glitching defeated detection in 4.5% of corrupted trials. Register-level soft-error injection shows SHA3-state upsets fail safe, whereas control or metadata upsets can hang a pass or skip a function. The time-of-check-to-time-of-use window is narrowed, not closed; the reset-cleared lock is not a root of trust; larger-scale costs are projections.
Java Card virtual machines execute from non-volatile memory in secure elements, where repeated reference indirection adds latency to frequently executed instructions. This paper proposes link-time bytecode quickening for the statically resolvable invocation and static-field instructions: after the ordinary installation...
Alp Sardağ, Abdullah Sardağ· Computers· 0 citations
Processing-in-Memory places small programmable cores on the memory device, where they execute beside the DRAM banks and beyond the control-flow defenses that protect host programs. The security of this in-memory code is an attack surface that remains largely unstudied. We present PIMROP, to our knowledge the first demo...
William C. Tegge, Shou-Zhi Fang, Alex K. Jones· 0 citations
Applying binary instrumentation to a running x86-64 process is difficult because variable-length instructions and weak alignment guarantees prevent safe in-place code modification under concurrent execution. Existing run-time approaches either trap concurrent threads on every overwrite or require global synchronization...
Jihun Baek, Sanghoon Han, Hyungon Moon· Proceedings of the 41st IEEE...· 0 citations
Memory-corruption errors remain a leading cause of high-impact vulnerabilities in C and C++ software. Deterministic detection, however, remains difficult to deploy: compiler-based sanitizers require source code and control of the build pipeline, hardware-assisted schemes depend on specific platforms, and dynamic binary...
Adel Belkhiri, Michel Dagenais, Maxime Lamothe· arXiv.org· 0 citations
Programmable garbled-circuit execution must balance the benefits of cross-program reuse against the cost of repeated work during secure execution. A complete garbled processor provides a fixed circuit for many programs, but its evaluator repeatedly visits processor-wide structures even when only a small part performs t...
Zi-Xi Feng, Xiao-Lin Li, Cheng-Lu Jin et al.· 0 citations
It is argued that reproducibility should be treated as a security property for code-defined hardware, firmware, and software artifacts, and this claim is evaluated in the Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) setting.
Francesco Corvaglia, Niccolò Lentini, Luca Mannella et al.· Proceedings of the 3rd Works...· 0 citations
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