Authentication, Chain of Custody, and the Exclusionary Rule for Electronic Evidence under Indonesia’s 2025 Criminal Procedure Code
Abstract
This article examines how the authenticity, integrity, and lawful acquisition of electronic evidence should be tested under Law Number 20 of 2025 on the Criminal Procedure Code (Indonesia’s 2025 Criminal Procedure Code), in force since 2 January 2026, with particular attention to special crimes such as corruption, money laundering, and cybercrime, where proof frequently depends on digital records. It is normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and case approaches; the Jessica Kumala Wongso case serves only as a limited illustration because the reasoning of its review judgment was not available. Earlier studies, including Samudra and colleagues (2026), identify the absence of a coherent governance framework, but do not link technical failures to distinct legal consequences or allocate the burden of authentication. The study finds that Article 235(5) provides that evidence declared non authentic or unlawfully obtained cannot be used at trial and has no probative force, yet the Code does not specify how authenticity and integrity are to be demonstrated. The article separates four sequential dimensions legal admissibility, lawful acquisition, technical reliability, and evidentiary weight and distinguishes origin authenticity, post-acquisition integrity, and the reliability of detection tools, since a hash value proves only that a copy has not changed since it was computed. It proposes seven parameters with an allocation of burdens, a proportionality test for procedural defects, and an anti double counting test, and applies them to CCTV footage, messaging data, mobile phone extraction, and a corruption scenario. The model implies an immediate need for minimum standards on bit-stream acquisition, hashing, chain-of-custody records, and controlled defence access, while remaining a normative framework that requires empirical testing.