Comparative Human Factors Analysis of Exxon Valdez (1989) and Ever Given (2021) Accidents with FRAM – Learning from Complex Decisions in Maritime High-Risk Operations
Abstract
Maritime operations are complex sociotechnical systems in which environmental conditions, technological resources, organizational arrangements, and human performance interact continuously and non-linearly. This paper comparatively reanalyzes two emblematic maritime accidents separated by 32 years: the Exxon Valdez grounding and oil spill in Prince William Sound in 1989 and the Ever Given grounding and blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), under a Human Factors approach, was applied to model the functional interactions and performance variability involved in both events, considering navigation, bridge coordination, pilotage, traffic management, environmental conditions, organizational arrangements, and shore-based support. The comparison shows that neither accident can be adequately explained by a single human error or isolated failure. In the Exxon Valdez, environmental variability associated with glacial ice and nighttime navigation interacted with organizational conditions involving staffing, workload, Vessel Traffic Service supervision, and structural protection, developing predominantly as a route-deviation and route-recovery problem. In the Ever Given, wind, sand, confined-water hydrodynamics, and vessel dimensions progressively reduced maneuvering margins, interacting with pilotage, Port Control, bridge coordination, tugboat availability, and stabilization support. Despite substantial technological advances between 1989 and 2021, the comparison demonstrates that fundamental organizational challenges related to ship–shore coordination, timely operational support, adequate resources, and adaptation to changing environmental demands remain relevant. The study demonstrates how FRAM can reveal these systemic interactions while shifting accident learning from individual blame toward strengthening the entire maritime sociotechnical system. Human adaptability should therefore be understood not primarily as a source of failure, but as an essential resource for resilience and safe performance in complex maritime operations.