Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that operate equipment, execute instructions, and act inside institutional hierarchies, raising a question social psychology answered for humans six decades ago: how far will an agent escalate a harmful action when a legitimate authority insists? We port Milgram's obedience paradigm to LLMs as a standardized, fully scripted, replicable probe: the model plays the Teacher, a deterministic harness plays Experimenter and Learner from paraphrased versions of Milgram's scripts (30 shock levels, 15-450 V; graded protests; the four standardized prods), and the outcome of a session is the breakoff voltage. We measure obedience profiles, empirical breakoff distributions over a battery of six conditions, for 42 models from 19 families (4848 sessions, 102511 logged decision turns). We find that (i) obedience is extremely heterogeneous, with baseline full-obedience rates spanning 0%-100% (census mean 42.9%; human anchor 65%). (ii) Profiles are model-specific and stable: split-half verification separates same-model from cross-model comparisons at AUC = 0.885. (iii) Situational sensitivity is selective: scripted peer defiance shifts obedience in the human direction, learner proximity trends the same way without reaching significance, and removing the authority's physical presence, one of the strongest human levers, trends in the opposite direction, also without reaching significance. (iv) Declaring the scenario fictional raises obedience, whereas moving the decision from a typed action line to a native tool call, or granting a modest thinking budget, lowers it sharply. (v) Unlike single-token fingerprints, obedience profiles do not recover model lineage: obedience identifies the checkpoint but not its ancestry, consistent with safety post-training overwriting lineage priors.
Benevolence bias is identified and measure, a small but consistent tendency for aligned LLMs to lean toward the kinder, safer, more socially approved answer on value-laden survey questions, and is easy to diagnose and straightforward to fix.
Yuanzi Li, Jun-Hao Wang, Minghui Liu et al.· 0 citations
Safety evaluations can mischaracterize deployed behaviour if artificial-intelligence systems respond to being evaluated. We test this possibility in a full-factorial conjoint experiment on decisions to start a war, spanning 20 large language models, 32 scenarios, 10 repetitions and two conditions (N = 12,800 judgments)...
A dispersion-first stress test of prompt-based controllability across 12 ideological personas plus an unsteered baseline, 70 Political Compass items, ten replicates, and seven leading LLMs: GPT-5, Claude, Grok, Gemini, DeepSeek, Kimi, and Qwen.
Bartol Bućan, Nikola Sočec, Sarah Isufi et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
A robust Political Compass Test evaluation framework is introduced that samples 300 configurations across an eight-dimensional perturbation space varying language, framing, instructions, answer format, option order, and persona wording, and results show most models lean Libertarian-Left on average and larger models sho...
Luka Debevc, Nishan Chatterjee, Antoine Doucet et al.· 0 citations
As LLMs increasingly shape the political information citizens rely on, no standard exists to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction ra...
B. Peters, Gabor Hollbeck, Robert Jakob et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
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