As LLMs increasingly shape the political information citizens rely on, no standard exists to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens'epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary the clarity, noise, and consistency of the available evidence. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs across the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down when it is absent, vague, or contradictory, while flattening the intensity of political language throughout. These failures point to party priors, shifting with party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.
As users increasingly turn to Large Language Models (LLMs) for information and advice on political matters, particularly during election periods, the political preferences expressed by these systems have become a matter of public interest. Prior research has shown that interactions with LLMs can influence users'political attitudes and choices, raising questions about how these models themselves evaluate political actors. In this paper, we investigate whether and how LLMs express preferences toward political parties and political leaders. We introduce a systematic and reproducible auditing framework in which multiple LLMs are prompted to evaluate parties and leaders across nine criteria. Rather than attempting to infer the models'"true"political beliefs, we focus on their observable behavior, examining consistency across evaluations, differences between models, refusal rates, and sensitivity to prompt formulation. We further investigate how these evaluations vary when models are instructed to adopt different personas. We demonstrate the framework through an Italian case study, providing a systematic analysis of LLM-generated political evaluations on italian parties and leaders.
Measuring political bias in large language models (LLMs) remains challenging as it can manifest through subtle differences in framing, argumentation, and legal reasoning that are difficult to capture with a single metric. In this work, we introduce Poli-Bias, a counterfactual framework for measuring whether LLMs treat legally equivalent conflict scenarios differently depending on the countries involved. Poli-Bias compares responses to paired prompts in which country identities are systematically swapped across diverse geopolitical relationships, legal violations, and reasoning tasks. Rather than reducing bias to a single judgment, our framework decomposes response disparities into five interpretable dimensions, revealing how and where unequal treatment manifests. Across 13 contemporary LLMs spanning diverse model families and sizes, we find that country identities and user affiliations can systematically affect how equivalent actions are described, evaluated, and defended under international law. Our results thus establish Poli-Bias as a fine-grained framework for auditing political even-handedness and sycophancy in LLMs.
Massi-Nissa Abboud, Aladin Djuhera, Elena Cabrio et al.· 0 citations
LLMs are increasingly deployed in settings that require collective reasoning on complex, value-laden problems. Confidence in these deployments rests largely on benchmarks for verifiable tasks (mathematics, coding, coordination games), yet many of these applications concern problems where no objectively correct answer exists and where decision quality instead depends on integrating pluralistic perspectives to find mutually acceptable solutions. We argue that LLM reasoning capacity on this class of problems cannot be fully inferred from verifiable-task benchmarks, and that procedural evaluations of LLM discourse (respectfulness, justification, engagement) are systematically insufficient. We apply the Deliberative Reason Index (DRI), a measure developed in political science and validated across citizen assemblies, as a tool for evaluating reliable group-level reasoning on pluralistic, non-verifiable problems. Synthesizing recent evidence across 1,980 five-agent LLM runs on 12 citizen-assembly topics across 11 frontier model configurations, we find that LLM groups produce discourse with procedural quality comparable to human deliberation, while gains in intersubjective consistency are small, topic-dependent, and concentrated on tractable rather than ethically contested questions. LLM groups exhibit roughly one-third the perspective diversity of human assemblies and reverse the human convergence pattern: human deliberation decreases dispersion as diverse views synthesise, whereas LLM deliberation increases it. Engineering diversity through persona prompting does not restore the human dynamic but inverts which component of deliberative reasoning is updated. Our conclusion is constraining rather than prohibitive: LLMs can function as tools supporting human reasoning on pluralistic problems, but current evidence does not license treating them as autonomous deliberative agents.
A framework that disentangles two distinct triggers of political sycophancy: opinion (aligning with explicit narratives) and identity (stereotyping based on demographic labels) is introduced, highlighting how personalization may amplify identity- or opinion-conditioned shifts in the model's behaviors.
Li-Ni Fu, Chang-Chih Meng, Chien-Hua Chen et al.· 0 citations
Large Language Models are increasingly deployed as information intermediaries, yet measuring their political behavior remains fragile because questionnaire results mix model dispositions with measurement artifacts and response-elicitation biases. We introduce a robust Political Compass Test evaluation framework that samples 300 configurations across an eight-dimensional perturbation space varying language, framing, instructions, answer format, option order, and persona wording. We evaluate eight Gemma 3 and Qwen 3 models across 14 languages and three quantization levels, obtaining design-averaged political coordinates with quantified uncertainty. Most models lean Libertarian-Left on average, but instruction phrasing, language, and answer format significantly affect recovered coordinates. Cross-lingual differences primarily reflect coordinate drift rather than distinct cultural reasoning. Reverse-engineering the test also exposes axis-weighting imbalances and the collapse of degenerate responses toward the center, so near-origin estimates for the smallest models can reflect weak signal rather than centrism. Free-text reasoning and chat-then-classify elicitation alter recovered coordinates, and larger models show clearer persona separation, with a specific failure of the Authoritarian-Left persona to move most models in the intended social direction. In downstream tasks, persona effects are modest relative to model size and target group for hate-speech detection, while base and centrist prompts give the highest agreement for topic-level sentiment. Political role prompting therefore has measurable but task- and dataset-specific downstream effects.
Luka Debevc, Nishan Chatterjee, Antoine Doucet et al.· 0 citations
LLMs are rapidly embedding themselves into daily life: drafting our emails, managing our schedules, and making decisions on our behalf. As they move from individual tools to participants in multi-agent organizations, an important question arises: do they reproduce the governance failures like free-riding, corruption, and entrenched leadership that plague human institutions? We introduce the Hierarchical Game (HG), a public goods game extended with managerial authority, democratic elections, and private communication. Testing six frontier models across twelve experiments that add institutions one at a time (speech, peers, government, wages, oversight, elections), we find distinct behavioral profiles: Qwen promises and lies (13.3\% broken promises); Grok refuses to cooperate on its own but becomes fully cooperative once a manager can punish it (16\%$\to$100\%); Claude and GPT-4o cooperate reliably at baseline. But honesty proves fragile. When the manager role comes with a salary, all models except GPT-4o start cutting private deals to win or keep the position. When punishment is made anonymous, honest models begin to cheat. When all agents share the same model family, the first elected manager stays in power indefinitely. Leadership change only happens in groups that mix different families.
Fatemeh Seyedin, Adrian Weller, Jinhyuk Yun et al.· 0 citations
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