This work benchmarks six estimators across five datasets and two known-effect sweeps, and validate the mechanisms against a non-simulated paired reference, finding that weak overlap is governed by logger-target action alignment, not by logging sharpness alone.
Abstract
Organizations decide whom to treat under a budget and want to know what a targeting rule would have earned before deploying it. Off-policy evaluation promises this from logged data, but the deployable rule is a deterministic top-k policy: it removes all averaging over actions, so weak overlap hits the estimate directly. We benchmark six estimators across five datasets and two known-effect sweeps, and validate the mechanisms against a non-simulated paired reference. First, weak overlap is governed by logger-target action alignment, not by logging sharpness alone: what governs support is the logger's probability of the target's actions. Sharpening a logger built from the target's own score barely moves overlap over the tested range; action-level disagreement collapses it. Effective sample size ranks this risk across logging environments, but is weak at ranking candidates within the single log a practitioner holds, and its cut point does not transfer. Second, the optimizer's curse is not fixed by cross-fitting the outcome nuisance. When the rule is fit on the data used to evaluate it, cross-fitting the nuisance alone leaves the reuse bias in place and makes it worse. Honest policy-level splitting avoids the reuse by targeting the learning procedure's value -- a change of estimand, not a de-biasing of the full-sample policy. Third, propensity-estimation error is the largest degradation we measure: an out-of-fold estimate hurts IPS more than any other stress we apply, leaves doubly-robust estimation almost unchanged, and can invert the overlap diagnostic itself. Logging is synthesized and propensities floored at 0.02, so every failure occurs with bounded weights; the floor also reduces the two tuned hybrids to their untuned parents, leaving four practically distinct estimators, and all exact-value surfaces are synthetic or semi-synthetic. We release the benchmark; public data only.
Offline multi-agent payoff models are estimated under a logging distribution but used on distributions induced by learned solutions and unilateral deviations. Standard held-out loss can therefore favor an interaction class that predicts logged play well while distorting strategic incentives. We introduce Selective Interaction-Rank Validation (SIRV) for finite games with known logging distributions. A training split fits nested payoff models and constructs a common union of all candidate deployment and unilateral-replacement distributions; an independent calibration split evaluates every candidate on this same union. SIRV returns the smallest rank whose simultaneous upper worst-target risk is within tolerance of the best upper score, and abstains when a declared target is unsupported or too imprecisely estimated. A common coverage event yields a finite-candidate target-risk bound and a candidate-specific coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) gap certificate. We also isolate an exact two-point off-support non-identifiability result. In a controlled factorial study with 2,048 independent games per family, empirical-Bernstein bounds reduce the median CCE-gap certificate by 42.5% relative to Hoeffding bounds on common returns, with a 1.36-point reduction in supported return. Under paired rank misspecification and in a separately generated congestion family, the SIRV-EB fallback rule lowers mean true candidate-selection CCE regret relative to ID-Mean, while retaining game-level losses. Across 384 games at $N=3,5,8$, ID-Mean-relative mean CCE-regret effects stay positive while certified return falls sharply under weak coverage. These results separate certifiable model selection from universal strategic improvement.
A blockchain-based commit-reveal protocol using Autonomous Economic Agents on an Ethereum-compatible ledger creates a tamper-evident audit trail that separates blind evaluation from post-hoc claims and reduces the verification burden on independent researchers and leaderboard operators.
This work defines the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and uses it to locate that boundary exactly.
Advertisers delegate bidding to autobidders; users delegate tasks to language-model agents. A person describes what they want to an automated proxy that acts in a mechanism on their behalf. This is the revelation principle in production, and it forces a question classical theory assumes away: when is it optimal to describe yourself honestly to your own proxy? We show the answer turns on one quantity, the proxy's within-range regret. The most a principal can gain by misreporting equals the regret of the proxy's honest-report action against those the principal could have steered it to take. Honest self-description is optimal exactly when the proxy already plays the best action it can reach, that is, when it is loyal (Theorem 1). The identity unifies auction-specific autobidding results and pins down when the faithful-communication assumption behind language-model elicitation proxies (Huang et al.) holds. The identity constrains guardrails placed on proxies, from bid caps to a model's alignment layer. No guardrail can be at once binding (it displaces the truthful action from the proxy's best reachable outcome), truthful (honest reporting stays optimal), and capability-preserving (that outcome stays reachable through some report); any two preclude the third (Theorem 2). A safety constraint that alters what a model does while leaving its best output reachable makes honest description of intent suboptimal, so a sharper report can gain. This is the incentive behind prompt-engineering and jailbreaking. Because within-range regret is #P-hard to compute exactly, we estimate it from samples and maintain it as a model is updated, at a cost set by how far the model drifts, not how often it changes. Running it on production language models from five providers under an alignment-style cap, we find honest reporting leaves surplus unclaimed on every model, recovered by inflating the report.
Off-policy evaluation (OPE) of ranking policies is challenging be- cause selecting and ordering multiple items from a candidate set makes the number of possible rankings grow combinatorially with the number of candidates and the ranking length. Consequently, Inverse Propensity Scoring (IPS), whose importance weight is the full-ranking probability ratio under the evaluation and logging policies, can have excessive variance. Independent IPS (IIPS) and Reward Interaction IPS (RIPS) reduce variance by imposing fixed assumptions on how users browse rankings, but may introduce bias when those assumptions mismatch actual behavior. Adaptive Inverse Propensity Scoring (AIPS) addresses this trade-off by adap- tively marginalizing importance weights over the actions that affect each position-wise reward. It attains minimum variance within a class of unbiased IPS-based estimators when the true user be- havior model is observed. However, its estimation accuracy may still degrade for longer rankings, and AIPS does not use a reward model for residual correction. We propose Adaptive Doubly Robust (ADR), which combines adaptive importance weighting with re- ward regression through a control-variate correction. We establish its unbiasedness when the true user behavior model is observed and characterize a sufficient condition under which it reduces vari- ance relative to AIPS. Across synthetic experiments with 10,000 simulations per condition, ADR improves mean squared error over AIPS and conventional ranking OPE estimators across a range of logged-data sizes and ranking lengths.
The minimal criterion under which a model may act as an oracle is derived, that trust must be purchased through selection-aware audits that are optimal in query complexity, and a dichotomy fixing when audited surrogates cut certified evaluation cost are proved.
Shuangxiu Ma, Wenhe Zhao· 0 citations
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