Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments. A growing class of their assurance failures arises not within any single platform but across the swarm: individually-compliant actions compose into a mission-level violation: a prohibited objective split across platforms to evade per-platform lim- its, or a collective budget quietly exceeded. Per-platform guardrails miss these by construction, and contested communications let the violation hide behind lost or delayed evidence. We present a three-tier (platfor- m/squad/mission) compositional runtime-verification framework that de- composes a mission policy into per-agent and cross-agent aspects, aggre- gates per-platform verdicts over a verification-aware messaging fabric, and fuses them with an evidence-aware, two-axis (security x complete- ness) algebra whose provenance names the platforms that jointly trig- gered a violation. Because the fabric makes evidence loss and silence observable, unsupported negative verdicts are downgraded to an explicit unknown rather than reported as mission-wide all-clears. On a simulated ISR mission, an indirect prompt injection that causes real LLM planners to split a prohibited collection task across four platforms is invisible to every per-platform monitor yet detected compositionally with full prove- nance; under an injected fault campaign a best-effort central monitor emits silent false all-clears while the verification-aware fabric emits none
Software-Defined Vehicles (SDVs) expand the automotive attack surface across source code, runtime logs, and deployment topologies, while safety constraints forbid autonomous agents from acting without oversight. This paper presents CyberLLM, a multi-agent, LLM-orchestrated framework that autonomously detects vulnerabilities and executes remediations under a formal, runtime safety guard. Detection combines a deterministic layer (regex rules, AST analyzers, and topology graph checks) with an LLM refinement pass, so a high-recall floor is complemented by high-precision reasoning. A decision agent aggregates findings, tags them with a human-centric asset taxonomy, and selects a tiered response, ratcheting its confidence with signed cross-session memory and re-planning feedback. Every action is validated against four contextual security properties and an independent action-alignment oracle before it is allowed to run, and refused actions trigger escalation and re-planning. A symmetric attack pipeline generates and replays exploits so both sides can be exercised on the same scenarios. On an independent, ground-truthed benchmark of nine original automotive ECU modules in C, C++, and Rust seeding 47 layered vulnerabilities plus clean controls, the always-on deterministic layer covers 34\% of the labeled vulnerabilities at perfect precision, and adding the grounded LLM refinement and completeness passes roughly doubles coverage to about 70\% (F1 $0.83$) while producing zero false positives on the clean controls. The results indicate that LLM agents can perform useful autonomous cyber-defense when wrapped in a deterministic, auditable safety envelope.
Nenad Petrovic, Oussama Jeddou, Feres Ben Fraj et al.· 0 citations
Integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) is moving from proof-of-concept demonstrations to system-level deployment in sixth-generation (6G) networks. Because sensing and communication share hardware, spectrum, and waveform resources, ISAC design now involves many tightly coupled choices, including waveform selection, sensing algorithm setup, resource scheduling, and deployment planning. This design space is already too large to manage well through manual tuning or isolated optimizers. This article introduces the \textit{Agent Compiler}, a large language model (LLM)-enabled compilation layer that translates high-level engineering intent into complete and executable ISAC system configurations. The Agent Compiler works in four stages: intent parsing, task decomposition, policy graph synthesis, and infrastructure mapping. It produces a verifiable intermediate representation called the ISAC Policy Graph (IPG). A runtime engine then deploys the compiled configuration and supports closed-loop adaptation at three levels: fast parameter updates, partial recompilation of affected subgraphs, and full workflow recompilation. The core design principle is strict time-scale separation: the LLM handles slow-loop strategic decisions, while proven algorithms retain real-time control in the fast loop. A UAV-assisted disaster rescue example illustrates the full compilation process. We also discuss open issues, including compilation latency, output reliability, constraint verification, and pipeline security, to guide future research.
Lijie Zheng, Xudong Zhong, Baoquan Ren et al.· 0 citations
This paper presents a coordination architecture for heterogeneous UAV/UGV swarms that synthesises mission actions from uncertain, multi-modal sensor evidence while preserving hardware-enforced safety at the actuation boundary. The approach combines radar, RF, acoustic, and visual observations with Topic-Based Communication Space Petri Net (TB-CSPN) orchestration to support incremental mission formation under partial and evolving information. Consultant agents transform sensor outputs into temporally bounded semantic tokens, while supervisor agents provide authorisation and policy-governed release of mission transitions. This separation between interpretation, coordination, and execution yields auditable decision paths, constrains non-determinism within the coordination layer through guards and synchronisation, and enables bounded-time integration of heterogeneous evidence. To improve resilience in contested environments, including cyber compromise, spoofing, jamming, and communication loss, the digital coordination layer is complemented by independent analogue safety envelopes that clamp or veto unsafe actuator commands issued to individual vehicles. A coastal-surveillance case study illustrates how the proposed architecture enables dependable, governed, and physically safe swarm coordination under operational uncertainty.
Uwe M. Borghoff, Paolo Bottoni, R. Pareschi· 0 citations
While Large Language Models (LLMs) can accelerate Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) for software-defined vehicles, their probabilistic nature causes"architectural drift", fabricating interfaces in behavioral views that lack structural foundations. To enforce deterministic interface alignment, we propose a stateful, multi-agent validation pipeline. The framework utilizes a sequential generation matrix (Class->Activity->Sequence) and Vehicle Signal Specification (VSS)-grounded Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). An independent AI Validator Agent dynamically audits outputs against a strict error taxonomy, triggering state-preserving backtracking loops to resolve incompatibilities. Evaluated on an Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) scenario, standard RAG yielded 0% Entity Traceability. Conversely, our multi-agent workflow eradicated cross-phase hallucinations, achieving 97% Entity Traceability, 87% Signal Conservation, and an 85% F1-score. This proves adversarial auditing enables LLMs to reliably synthesize zero-error MBSE architectures.
Aleksei Velsh, Nenad Petrovic, Alois Knoll· 0 citations
Multi-agent systems built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for complex tasks requiring autonomous planning, tool use, and inter-agent coordination. However, the non-deterministic nature of LLM outputs and the emergent behavior arising from agent interactions render traditional test oracles ineffective, creating a critical gap in quality assurance for agentic AI. This work introduces MORPHAGENT, a framework designed to address the oracle problem in multi-agent LLM systems through trace-based behavioral analysis. Our contributions are threefold: (1) goal-preservation relations that verify consistent goal achievement under input perturbations, (2) coordination-consistency relations that validate inter-agent delegation and communication patterns under agent substitution and reordering, and (3) tool-use integrity relations that ensure semantic equivalence of tool invocation sequences under prompt paraphrasing. MorphAgent instruments agent execution to capture structured traces comprising planning steps, tool calls, message exchanges, and final outputs, then systematically applies metamorphic transformations and checks behavioral invariants without requiring ground-truth oracles. We evaluate the framework on four multi-agent benchmarks spanning code generation, research synthesis, customer service, and data analysis tasks, encompassing 2,840 source-followup execution pairs across three LLM backends. Results show that MORPHAGENT detects 82.0% of seeded behavioral faults, including 90.3% of coordination failures and 81.7% of goal-deviation faults, while maintaining a false positive rate of 6.1%. The framework uncovers 14 previously unreported behavioral anomalies in established multi-agent frameworks, demonstrating its practical utility for assuring agentic AI reliability. These results suggest that trace-based metamorphic testing can serve as a practical foundation for reliable validation of emerging agentic AI systems.
Gopalakrishnan Marimuthu· International Conference on...· 0 citations
Understanding large codebases is a long-horizon task for Large Language Model (LLM) agents: answering a single question can require building and running the software, tracing execution across files, and synthesizing evidence over tens of minutes. On SWE-Atlas QnA, a benchmark of long-horizon questions over production repositories, a single Claude Code agent (Opus 4.6) resolves only 32.3% of tasks. Dividing the work among agents with clean contexts mitigates this limitation. However, the subtasks of code comprehension are interdependent. One agent's findings can rewrite another's task, so agents must coordinate during execution, not only at phase boundaries. Existing multi-agent systems support such exchange only between phases, through staged handoffs or synchronized rounds. Communication and work remain mutually exclusive. A discovery made mid-execution cannot be shared until the next boundary. We present AgentRadio, an asynchronous message-passing layer that equips coding-agent harnesses with three primitives: threads, messages, and waiting for mentions. The last runs as a background task, surfacing teammates'messages without interrupting foreground work, so each agent remains passively aware of its peers and folds new findings into its ongoing task. Under a five-phase protocol of division of labor and negotiation, four agents organized by AgentRadio resolve 62.1% of tasks, 29.8 points above a single agent and above Claude Code with the newer Opus 4.8 (57.2%). Rubric-level analysis shows the gain growing with task difficulty, consistent with mid-course correction as the underlying mechanism. Our code is available at https://github.com/Coral-Protocol/AgentRadio.
Xinxing Ren, Qianbo Zang, Ziyan Wang et al.· 0 citations