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Compute eXpress Leak: New Cache Attacks Using CXL Devices

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TL;DR

SnoopDog is presented, a forward-looking cross-host timing attack that distinguishes whether a cache line is privately owned by another host based on access latency, and end-to-end cross-host side-channel attacks, including recovery of tokens from large language model inference when model weights are shared across hosts on a CXL memory device.

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