Jul 2026· International Conference on Smart Communications and Networking· pp. 1-7· 0 citations· 13 references
Abstract
This paper presents OS-NLI, a privacy-respecting and modular natural-language interface for operating-system tasks. Unlike vendor-bound assistants, OS-NLI separates intent interpretation from command execution through an architecture comprising a web interface, a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) layer, an API, an encrypted datastore, and a local execution worker. The LLM is treated as an untrusted suggestion engine: only pre-approved command templates with validated parameters may be queued, and execution requires explicit user confirmation. Sensitive data are protected with TLS in transit and AES-GCM at rest, while the threat model explicitly excludes hosts that are fully compromised at runtime. A prototype was implemented across Windows 11 and Fedora Linux. Evaluation on 60 natural-language queries shows strong task performance for application and utility identification, median answer latency of 1.4 s, and median post-confirmation command-execution latency of 285 ms. Preliminary malicious-input checks indicate that non-allowlisted outputs are rejected before execution. The current prototype still relies on vendor-hosted components for the UI host and LLM, so it is not yet end-to-end auditable; however, the architecture isolates these dependencies and provides a practical migration path to self-hosted deployment. These results support the feasibility of a safer, auditable design for naturallanguage OS interaction.
The threat model in the HPC setting is defined, attack surfaces created by schedulers, shared storage, multi-project accounts, and scientific workflows are identified, and where current controls fall short is examined.
A privacy-preserving hybrid middleware architecture that enforces a local trust boundary as its primary design constraint that is model-agnostic, requires no retraining of the underlying LLM, and is compatible with black-box API deployments is proposed and evaluated.
Adam Ait Hsine, A. Arabo· Electronics· 0 citations
Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, etc. have become integral tools for technical writing, software development, and communication. However, these systems, despite privacy assurances, still expose a significant privacy risk. User prompts often contain personally identifiable or proprietary information that is transmitted in plain-text to external providers, where it may be logged or accessed despite opt-out policies. This research aims to address this gap by designing a lightweight local encryption middleware that acts as a privacy firewall between users and remote AI APIs. Before a message is sent, the middleware automatically detects sensitive entities (Personally Identifiable Information or PII) and replaces them with typed placeholders such as [PERSON_1] or [ORG_1]. A local mapping (with optional authenticated encryption at rest) links these placeholders to their original values, allowing the system to reconstruct (rehydrate) the final response once the model replies. This design aims to reduce the exposure of sensitive information in human-readable form while maintaining the AI output. We evaluate the system in terms of detection accuracy, reconstruction fidelity, and utility preservation, demonstrating a practical solution for privacy-preserving LLM interaction.
Aditya Vishwakarma, Wencen Wu· International Conference on...· 0 citations
This paper proposes SecureMCP, a policy-enforced framework that integrates Role-Based Access Control with an MCP server to establish multi-layer defense for LLM-generated SQL execution, and evaluates filter performance—false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR))—separately from LLM generation quality.
Wonbae Kim, Hee-Kyong Yoo, Nammee Moon· Applied Sciences· 0 citations
The first extraction attack designed for this threat model, SPORE decouples the adversarial command from retrieval anchors by persisting the command in short-term memory and emitting semantically pure anchors in tool responses, demonstrating that memory isolation alone is insufficient and call for reexamining tool-side trust boundaries in agent architectures.
An open-source, privacy-focused, user-facing firewall designed to secure both web-based and programmatic LLM interactions and its layered architecture enables deployment across heterogeneous environments, allowing organizations to balance computational cost, detection depth and latency.
Hugo Garc'ia Cuesta, Pablo Mateo Torrej'on, Alfonso Sánchez-Macián· arXiv.org· 0 citations
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