Jul 2026· International Conference on Big Data Computing Service and Applications· pp. 227-231· 0 citations· 11 references
Abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, etc. have become integral tools for technical writing, software development, and communication. However, these systems, despite privacy assurances, still expose a significant privacy risk. User prompts often contain personally identifiable or proprietary information that is transmitted in plain-text to external providers, where it may be logged or accessed despite opt-out policies. This research aims to address this gap by designing a lightweight local encryption middleware that acts as a privacy firewall between users and remote AI APIs. Before a message is sent, the middleware automatically detects sensitive entities (Personally Identifiable Information or PII) and replaces them with typed placeholders such as [PERSON_1] or [ORG_1]. A local mapping (with optional authenticated encryption at rest) links these placeholders to their original values, allowing the system to reconstruct (rehydrate) the final response once the model replies. This design aims to reduce the exposure of sensitive information in human-readable form while maintaining the AI output. We evaluate the system in terms of detection accuracy, reconstruction fidelity, and utility preservation, demonstrating a practical solution for privacy-preserving LLM interaction.
A privacy-preserving hybrid middleware architecture that enforces a local trust boundary as its primary design constraint that is model-agnostic, requires no retraining of the underlying LLM, and is compatible with black-box API deployments is proposed and evaluated.
Adam Ait Hsine, A. Arabo· Electronics· 0 citations
This paper introduces the Sensitive Entity Alias Generator (SEAG), a privacy-preserving framework that empowers users to utilize powerful third-party generators without disclosing sensitive information and demonstrates the success of the SEAG framework.
Saleh Almohaimeed, Saad Almohaimeed, Mousa Jari et al.· 0 citations
LLM agents can leak privacy (e.g., paths, emails) and credentials (e.g., API keys) as agent observations (e.g., tool outputs, shell logs, and file reads) are appended to provider-bound transcripts. Existing placeholder redaction is brittle: it can miss embedded or cross-turn references, over-redact benign lookalikes, and destroy the structure useful for reasoning. We present SlotGuard, a local transcript boundary that can hide sensitive data while retaining agents'performance. SlotGuard rewrites structural bindings as typed, suffix-aware slots, replaces secrets with format-preserving synthetic values, links cross-turn references with a lightweight session graph, and restores raw values only inside the trusted runtime. On controlled repository-oriented agent transcripts, SlotGuard removes all 20,814 annotated structurally sensitive characters across 9,229 paths and reduces credential leakage to 0.0\% across 852 planted values. It remains close to raw-transcript task success across four upstream models, while generic redaction drops to 2.5\%. Transcript rewriting takes a median of 14.424~$\mu$s per agent turn. The code is publicly accessible at https://github.com/illinoisdata/SlotGuard.
Minimum-Necessary Communication is introduced, a typed semantic-declassification protocol that selects a task-sufficient disclosure from an application-authored candidate family and binds it to explicit recipient, purpose, forwarding, lifetime, logging, and memory scopes.
Jingheng Xu, Longze Fan, Zeyuan Wang et al.· 0 citations