This work develops a formal framework for reasoning jointly about capability safety, speculative execution, and information-flow security, and presents SCHERI, a new processor design that formally proves that it provides end-to-end secure speculation guarantees for the constant-time policy.
Abstract
Capability-based architectures such as CHERI provide strong support for the architectural isolation of software components. To additionally protect against microarchitectural leakage, software can be written in a constant-time fashion. Modern processors, however, rely heavily on speculative execution, which can invalidate the constant-time guarantees and leak isolated secrets transiently. In this work, we show that providing secure speculation for CHERI is non-trivial, and that existing proposals fail to preserve the confidentiality guarantees. We develop a formal framework for reasoning jointly about capability safety, speculative execution, and information-flow security, and use it to demonstrate potential leaks. We then present SCHERI, a new processor design within this framework, and formally prove that it provides end-to-end secure speculation guarantees for the constant-time policy. Our results provide formal foundations and practical guidance for building future capability-based processors, which are resilient to Spectre attacks for constant-time programs.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-supported isolation through enclaves that protect code and data independently of software abstractions. However, TEEs alone cannot enforce information-flow security. This problem is further aggravated in LLVM-like low-level languages that allow unrestricted pointer...
Wesley B. Nuzzo, Samuel Dodson, Benjamin Houle et al.· 0 citations
Superoptimization is a powerful code optimization technique that generates optimized instruction sequences by exploring the space of instruction-level transformations. However, existing superoptimizers assume that pointers and integers are interchangeable, an assumption that no longer holds in memory-security-enhanced...
Xiao-Yang Sun, Dejice Jacob, Huan-Ting Wang et al.· Proceedings of the ACM on Pr...· 0 citations
To the knowledge, this represents the first open-source RISC-V processor that is both Linux-capable and specifically targeted at booting the Keystone framework, including adapting Keystone software to the authors' platform, while simultaneously addressing hardware-level faults.
Pranav Bellur, Rohan Das, S. Karthikeyan· 0 citations
Co-design of hardware and software offers stronger security and ease of use The CHERIoT platform is a RISC-V-based ISA, an RTOS, and a programmer model that were co-designed for security. The ISA provides hardware mechanisms for enforcing spatial and (heap) temporal memory safety, type safety for opaque types, and ligh...
This paper identifies a common weakness in Rust-based systems: extensions, even those that may be considered “safe,” may fail to uphold the language properties on which these systems rely.
CO Tiffany, Artem Agvanian, Zian Song et al.· Proceedings of the 14th Work...· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong potential for assisting software and security analysis tasks, yet their effectiveness in cryptographic symbolic protocol verification remains insufficiently understood. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic evaluation of the capability of state-of-the-art LLMs in...