Sep 2026· Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on Programming Languages and Operating Systems· 0 citations· 43 references
TL;DR
This paper identifies a common weakness in Rust-based systems: extensions, even those that may be considered “safe,” may fail to uphold the language properties on which these systems rely.
Abstract
Over the past decade, systems research has leveraged Rust to build systems that enforce valuable security and isolation guarantees over user-provided code in extensions. This paper identifies a common weakness in these Rust-based systems: extensions, even those that may be considered “safe,” may fail to uphold the language properties on which these systems rely. We present case studies where this mismatch breaks system guarantees and “safe” extensions corrupt kernel state in RedLeaf [35] and leak private data in Sesame [13]. As a path forward, we propose tooling to detect possible violations of system invariants in extension code. An early prototype static analysis tool suggests that this approach detects guarantee-breaking code with low false-positive rates.
Rust is increasingly used as a viable alternative to C and C++ for systems development. A central appeal of Rust is its “zero-cost” abstractions and, specifically, its ability to enforce safety without the overhead of garbage collection. In practice, however, only a subset of safety properties can be enforced staticall...
Soham Bagchi, Manvik Nanda, A. Burtsev· Proceedings of the 14th Work...· 0 citations
Rust has emerged as the leading system programming language, offering strong memory and type safety guarantees without compromising performance. This positions it as a compelling alternative to traditional languages like C and C++, which are susceptible to memory security bugs. However, manually transforming C to Rust...
Hung-Mao Chen, Xu He, Bo Lu et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
How to extend RefinedRust with several of the high-level abstractions that Rust provides, including traits, closures, and iterators, and in a manner such that they can be used in conjunction with unsafe code.
Lennard Gäher, Vincent Lafeychine, Sascha Kehrli et al.· Proceedings of the ACM on Pr...· 0 citations
This work develops a formal framework for reasoning jointly about capability safety, speculative execution, and information-flow security, and presents SCHERI, a new processor design that formally proves that it provides end-to-end secure speculation guarantees for the constant-time policy.
Shi-Xin Song, Davide Davoli, Elias Storme et al.· 0 citations
Restricting the system calls available to applications shrinks the kernel's attack surface and greatly mitigates the impact of compromised programs. Recent approaches showcase techniques to generate system call filters, however, all existing solutions require either kernel or application modifications to activate them...
Matthew Rossi, Marco Abbadini, M. Beretta et al.· 0 citations
This work presents zBulk, an automatic compartmentalization system that requires zero retrofitting to application code and paves the way for flexible fine-grained compartmentalization, and shows how to design zBulk, leveraging rustc's intermediate representations.
Maxim Ritter von Onciul, Phillip Raffeck, Peter Wägemann et al.· Programming Languages and Op...· 0 citations
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