It is shown that selective control under partial auditing reduces accepted errors while increasing correctness, and experiments with log linear and neural contextual bandits and with a language model support the analysis and show that selective control under partial auditing reduces accepted errors while increasing correctness.
Abstract
In reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), imperfect verifiers can reward incorrect responses, creating opportunities for reward hacking. Using gradient flow with a fixed verifier, we characterize the conditions under which reward rises while correctness falls. We then show that the observations available during RLVR are, in general, insufficient to detect or identify accepted errors, or to guarantee their reduction without sacrificing correct responses. To address this limit, we construct a correction using additional feedback about correctness from audits. This correction achieves \emph{selective control}: at the current policy, it lowers the probability of accepted errors and raises that of correct responses, provided it outweighs the pressure toward errors from verifier reward. Experiments with log linear and neural contextual bandits and with a language model support the analysis and show that selective control under partial auditing reduces accepted errors while increasing correctness.
This work applies metamorphic testing to the verifier rather than the model, generating certified equivalent answer variants, that is, rewrites that preserve mathematical meaning by construction, so that any rejection is a provable false negative needing no human adjudication.
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