These findings show why successful outcome recovery is insufficient evidence of exactly-once execution, and establish conformance within one calibrated deterministic testbed, rather than general safety or real-world self-improvement.
Abstract
Self-improving agent workflows create an audit problem when the same controller can change both its behavior and the conditions under which that behavior is judged. We present GuardrailLoop, a simulation-based testbed that makes three operational contracts jointly testable: preservation of human-defined policy, compute accounting at every recorded execution prefix, and recovery of a specified scientific state after crashes. A hash-pinned policy fixes goals, scope, evaluation identity, budget, and release conditions; machine-directed evolution is restricted to a code-owned feature catalog and bounded knobs. The contribution is an executable boundary and an evaluation protocol that separates useful adaptation, state recovery, and repeated execution. In a paired 50-seed 2 x 2 study, round-stage growth changes target attainment by +1.00 and restricted mean compute to target by -56.97 simulated GPU-hours (95% paired-bootstrap interval [-58.91,-54.70]); idle growth has zero measured utility effect. Across 240 enumerated crash injections, all runs recover the defined outcome, but only 210 preserve the normalized trace: 30 pre-commit crashes repeat a planner call. Resource-drift, kill-switch, integrity, and output-guard matrices satisfy their specified checks. These findings show why successful outcome recovery is insufficient evidence of exactly-once execution. They establish conformance within one calibrated deterministic testbed, rather than general safety or real-world self-improvement.
Long-running tools can dominate coding-agent latency: compilers, test suites, and repository commands take seconds to minutes while the agent idles. This observation stall presents the same tension that drove out-of-order processors -- asequential interface hides work that can be predicted and started early, but a spec...
Jiang-Nan Yu, Ce-Yu Xu, Meng-Ming Li et al.· 0 citations
Tool-using language-model agents select and execute third-party artifacts. Different implementations can return the requested output while producing hidden execution effects that task-, attack-, or choice-based evaluations may miss. We study functional counterfeits: implementations that match benign alternatives on the...
XiaoYu Xu, Zi Liang, Min-Xin Du et al.· 0 citations
DDBench is introduced, a code-repair benchmark of 60 historical bugs mined from 13 open-source distributed systems, partitioned into three difficulty tiers, isolating the effect of debugging context from model capability.
Yi-Bo Yan, Huijuan Wang, Jun-Zhou He et al.· 0 citations
The results indicate that reliable agent self-evolution requires co-designing verification, state grounding, witness semantics, and recovery-language expressivity rather than relying on iterative prompting alone.
Tanmay Sah, Dolly Sah, Harshul Jain et al.· 0 citations
Large language model agents can execute commands, create subprocesses, and directly access files and networks, allowing prompt injection or planning errors to become operating-system side effects. We present ContractWarden, a Linux reference monitor that enforces a human-authorized damage boundary without trusting the...
Dong-Xuan Cui, Zhi-Chao Gu, Ping Zheng et al.· 0 citations
An AI evaluation can be perfectly reproducible and still support the wrong claim. This risk is acute in closed-loop systems: policy determines visited states, observable components, and which failures leave a measurable trace. We propose a claim-safe protocol with three actions. Refuse: abstain when a clean reference s...
Pei-Ke Zhu, Si-Di Chang· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.