A descriptive model of agent-documentation interaction is derived as a two-lobed cycle rather than a linear journey, and it is shown that two widely assumed properties of"agent-friendly"documentation - actionability and verifiability - lack consistent behavioural support.
Abstract
Technical documentation is written for human developers, but an increasing share of software changes is now authored by autonomous coding agents. Which documents they consult, when, and what follows remain unknown. We conduct a behaviour-grounded study of agent-documentation interaction across two public datasets: 557 agentic coding sessions from SWE-chat, yielding 94,813 development events including 3,033 documentation interactions; and 33,097 agentic pull requests from AIDev, with 690,260 classified file-level change records. Four findings challenge current documentation practice. First, agents'documentation work is dominated by agent-facing artefacts: instruction files and working notes account for 60.5% of all documentation interactions, versus 10.6% for classical technical documentation and 1.3% for API references. Second, the link between consultation and code editing is unresolved: the adjacent transition probability is 0.002 and the unadjusted three-event lift 1.05, whereas a stage-adjusted model places it above unity (OR 1.33 [1.09, 1.62]); documentation creation is elevated unadjusted (lift 1.67) but its adjusted interval includes unity. Third, no explicit documentation-based validation sequence was observed, and consultation is associated with less immediate testing (lift 0.23, cluster CI 0.08-0.45; adjusted OR 0.39 [0.25, 0.60]). Fourth, consultation is self-initiated (70.2%) far more often than failure-driven (7.5%), and documentation trails code: among multi-commit pull requests changing both, code is touched first 4.7x more often. From these traces we derive a descriptive model of agent-documentation interaction as a two-lobed cycle rather than a linear journey, and show that two widely assumed properties of"agent-friendly"documentation - actionability and verifiability - lack consistent behavioural support. We release our pipeline, coding scheme, and event-level data.
MAGE explains how externalized knowledge, bounded action, independent evaluation, and retained human authority can compose into a governed engineering environment, and proposes tests of when that environment turns commodity intelligence into durable engineering progress.
James C. Davis, Kelechi G. Kalu, Huiyun Peng et al.· 1 citation
LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, yet they frequently hallucinate non-existent software packages, creating exploitable entry points into the software supply chain. We make four contributions to this problem. First, we show that prior evaluation methodologies systematically inflate hallucination rates by misclassifying standard-library modules as hallucinations in some languages. For Python, the overestimation reaches 9.4 percentage points. Second, we evaluate seven inference-time defenses for mitigating package hallucinations, including five guided decoding strategies (Greedy, Contrastive, DoLa, Nudging, and Active Layer-Contrastive Decoding), an iterative self-refinement approach (Self-Refine), and a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based defense.. Across eight models spanning five families and four programming languages (Python, JavaScript, Ruby, Rust), RAG reduces the package hallucination rate (PHR) in 18 of 32 model--language configurations. Third, we introduce Package Utility (PU) to assess whether defenses preserve valid and task-relevant recommendations. Among strategies evaluated, Greedy decoding provides the strongest average mitigation--utility trade-off. Fourth, we stress-test all strategies under adversarial prompts seeded with fabricated package names and find that PHR surges by up to 45 percentage points relative to standard prompts, with Ruby consistently the most vulnerable language (80.9--95.2\%). Under adversarial conditions, RAG and Self-Refine outperform all decoding-only strategies, indicating that robust defense requires either external grounding or iterative self-verification when prompts are actively hostile. Our results recast package hallucination as both a measurement problem and a decoding-time control problem, and they demonstrate that the choice of defense must be matched to the threat model and recommendation utility.
Albérick Euraste Djiré, Iyiola E. Olatunji, Melissa Tessa et al.· 1 citation
HawkEye is introduced, a modular, web-based vulnerability auditing platform designed to streamline security analysis by integrating multiple scanning tools within a unified dashboard and illustrates how consolidated reporting improves vulnerability prioritization for development teams.
D. R. Patil, Varad Salgare, Devaj Arya et al.· International Journal for Re...· 0 citations
By streamlining workflows and fostering collaboration, this platform offers a scalable, cost- effective solution for SMEs and contributes to software engineering by demonstrating how integrated technologies can modernize development processes in resource limited contexts, with potential for broader adoption in Albania and beyond.
The findings of the present study indicated that potential complications such as delayed union, nonunion, and osteomyelitis in the intramedullary nailing method are approximately comparable to those of the external fixator method.
Reza Noktesanj, Ali Nami, F. Amani et al.· journal of Health Research a...· 0 citations
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