Skip to content
Open access

CAEBA: A Dynamic Hidden Backdoor Attack Framework in Federated Learning

Jul 2026 · ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security · Vol 29, pp. 1 - 21 · 0 citations · 55 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This work proposes CAEBA (Conditional AutoEncoder Backdoor Attack), a dynamic hidden backdoor framework that uses a conditional autoencoder to generate target-aware and visually stealthy triggers while progressively implanting the backdoor through federated optimization.

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) is a privacy-preserving distributed learning framework, but its distributed data collection and client-side training pipeline expose the global model to backdoor attacks. Existing FL backdoor attacks often depend on fixed triggers or on update manipulations that are easier to isolate under robust aggregation and model-inspection defenses. We propose CAEBA (Conditional AutoEncoder Backdoor Attack), a dynamic hidden backdoor framework that uses a conditional autoencoder to generate target-aware and visually stealthy triggers while progressively implanting the backdoor through federated optimization. CAEBA separates the clean classifier from the trigger generator, formulates the attack as a dual-constrained objective, and updates the generator at a lower frequency than the classifier to stabilize local optimization. We evaluate CAEBA on MNIST, FashionMNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet under representative aggregation rules and defenses, including FL-Detector, RFLBAT, DeepSight, FoolsGold, and FLAME. The results show that CAEBA preserves main-task accuracy while maintaining persistent backdoor effectiveness.

Read PDF

Similar papers

Conference 2026

FedRGD: Risk-Guided Dynamic Defense against Federated Backdoors

FedRGD is a federated risk-guided dynamic defense framework that enables efficient fine-grained protection against backdoor attacks in non-IID environments, and combines feature inconsistency detection with lightweight masking and robust aggregation to achieve both accuracy and efficiency.

Rui-Ying Wang · 0 citations
Open access Jul 2026

A Comprehensive Defense Framework Against Poisoning Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning

This work employs the novel dimensionality reduction technique UMAP and a stringent filtering mechanism to effectively identify and exclude potential malicious participants without relying on traditional noise addition methods and demonstrates that the proposed method maintains high main task accuracy while effectively...

Chun-I Fan, Hsin-Yen Wang, Tomohiro Morikawa · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

FedGAT: a backdoor attack based on global model feedback optimized triggers in federated learning

A novel backdoor attack method, termed Federated Generative Adversarial Trigger (FedGAT), which adopts a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) framework, and can automatically produce optimized triggers that are highly correlated with the global model’s feature space, effectively reducing the “loss” in backdoor transfer...

Tao Liu, Ji-Guang Lv, D. Man et al. · 0 citations
Conference Jul 2026

GOFA: Gradient-Oriented Backdoor Attack in Vertical Federated Learning

Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) allows multiple organizations with disjoint feature spaces and overlapping sample identities to collaboratively train machine learning models while keeping local data. Despite its privacy-preserving design, recent studies have shown that VFL is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. In partic...

Ye Cheng, Naotoshi Adachi · 0 citations
Book Open access Aug 2026

FedPurify: Knowledge-Preserving Backdoor Defense with Data-Free Purification in Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) facilitates distributed training while preserving privacy, yet remains highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing defenses primarily address these threats via robust aggregation, which reduces the influence of malicious contributions (e.g., pruning, reweighting), or through detection-based...

Baolu Xue, Hanyuan Zheng, T. Man et al. · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

BackDFL: A Unified Benchmark For Backdoor Attacks and Defenses In Decentralized Federated Learning

BackDFL is presented, a unified benchmark for systematically evaluating DFL under realistic and adaptive backdoor attacks, and demonstrates that both state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust DFL methods and adapted FL backdoor defenses fail under modest malicious participation rates, especially in heterogeneous settings.

M. Bouchiha, Gregory Blanc, Yu-Fei Han · 0 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.