Aug 2026· Cybersecurity· Vol 9· 0 citations· 47 references
TL;DR
A novel backdoor attack method, termed Federated Generative Adversarial Trigger (FedGAT), which adopts a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) framework, and can automatically produce optimized triggers that are highly correlated with the global model’s feature space, effectively reducing the “loss” in backdoor transfer and improving attack performance.
Abstract
Federated learning (FL) has been widely applied in Internet of Things (IoT) systems. However, its inherently distributed nature makes it vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing attacks typically design triggers based on fixed patterns or local models, without considering their applicability to the global model. Consequently, a significant “loss” occurs during the transfer of the backdoor from the local model to the global model, leading to a low Attack Success Rate (ASR). To address this issue, we propose a novel backdoor attack method, termed Federated Generative Adversarial Trigger (FedGAT). The proposed method optimizes the trigger by training it with publicly available global models and a small number of samples. It adopts a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) framework, in which the discriminator is fixed as the converged global model to guide the generator’s training through feedback. As a result, the generator can automatically produce optimized triggers that are highly correlated with the global model’s feature space, effectively reducing the “loss” in backdoor transfer and improving attack performance. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets demonstrate that, without amplifying malicious updates, the proposed method achieves an ASR improvement of 60.95–80.19% over the average baseline performance on the global model, exhibiting outstanding attack capability. Our work raises new challenges for the secure deployment of FL systems.
This work employs the novel dimensionality reduction technique UMAP and a stringent filtering mechanism to effectively identify and exclude potential malicious participants without relying on traditional noise addition methods and demonstrates that the proposed method maintains high main task accuracy while effectively mitigating backdoor attacks across various attack scenarios.
FedRGD is a federated risk-guided dynamic defense framework that enables efficient fine-grained protection against backdoor attacks in non-IID environments, and combines feature inconsistency detection with lightweight masking and robust aggregation to achieve both accuracy and efficiency.
Rui-Ying Wang· Poster Volume 0008 The 2026...· 0 citations
Federated learning, as a privacy-preserving distributed machine learning paradigm, faces significant threats from backdoor attacks. Compared to centralized attacks, distributed backdoor attacks are more harmful but require more poisoned samples to compensate for the loss of trigger strength due to decomposition. Fixed trigger patterns are also easily detected by robust aggregation algorithms, increasing the risk of attack exposure. To address these challenges, we propose a fine-grained distributed backdoor attack framework (FDBA). This framework uses dynamic trigger generation and embedding vector optimization to perform attacks with fewer poisoned samples. First, we design a dynamic trigger generation method based on image edge structures using the Canny algorithm to extract edge features, which are then injected with Laplacian noise. RGB channel decomposition is applied for covert adaptation of the distributed trigger, reducing detection chances. Second, we introduce an embedding vector contrastive learning strategy that forces poisoned samples to approach the target class center in the feature space, enhancing attack effectiveness. On CIFAR-10, piecewise-linear estimates for target ASRs between 70\% and 90\% show that FDBA reduces the required poisoning ratio by 37.4\%--48.4\% compared with DBA. In non-independent and identically distributed (Non-IID) scenarios, FDBA retains 84.7\% of its IID attack performance under extreme heterogeneity, whereas DBA drops to 73.5\%, and the framework successfully bypasses mainstream defense mechanisms. This study offers new insights into federated learning security and emphasizes the potential threats and defense challenges posed by fine-grained distributed attacks.
BackDFL is presented, a unified benchmark for systematically evaluating DFL under realistic and adaptive backdoor attacks, and demonstrates that both state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust DFL methods and adapted FL backdoor defenses fail under modest malicious participation rates, especially in heterogeneous settings.
M. Bouchiha, Gregory Blanc, Yu-Fei Han· 0 citations
To mitigate the attacks of transferable adversarial examples, a defense mechanism stemming from the transferability of model robustness by adversarial training is designed, gaining insights into adversarial examples and the vulnerability of federated learning systems.
Zuobin Xiong, Deval Mukherjee, Homook Cho et al.· International Conference on...· 0 citations