Design-level security weaknesses can arise from requirements, trust assumptions, missing controls, and data flows before implementation begins. Existing security practices often identify these issues after code is written. We present a multi-agent LLM framework for design-time security analysis from product requirement...
Akash Iyer, Taha Demirkan, Keerthi Koneru et al.· 0 citations
Retrieval-augmented systems increasingly rely on vector indexes that may retain deleted items in their search graph. Existing deletion interfaces can prevent deleted identifiers from appearing in returned results while still computing distances to their embeddings during graph traversal. We formalize this distinction a...
Agentic AI is emerging as a promising paradigm for automating complex cybersecurity decisions, yet its use in enforcing zero trust introduces significant challenges in safety, reliability, and policy compliance. This paper presents Agentic AI based zero trust architecture (Agentic-ZTA) that operationalizes the NIST SP...
Shovan Roy, Lopamudra Praharaj, Maanak Gupta et al.· 0 citations
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly trained to generate structured outputs like points and bounding boxes that downstream interfaces, agents, and robots can act on, yet safety alignment of this output channel has not been systematically analyzed. We study visual grounding safety by repurposing three safety b...
Erfan Shayegani, Kundan Krishna, Yue Dong et al.· 0 citations
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Long-horizon tool-using AI agents create subgoals, replan, delegate work, and compose sibling results. Per-tool permission checks cannot establish that a changing goal graph remains within the principal-approved task. We address this authorization gap in a finite structured domain with one principal and one authorizati...
A verifier for an agent faces rules of two kinds: the ones a fixed check can settle and the ones that require a judge. A team that derives its own checks fixes that split up front. Where the requirements come from outside, as in finance, healthcare and law, the agent enforces rules it did not write, so the split falls...
Agents are entering finance, healthcare and law, sectors where a violation leaves no lexical signature and carries real penalties. Whether an omission is material, or a disclosure sufficient, depends on what the response left out. Probing such an obligation means finding responses one minimal edit from flipping complia...
Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that conceal harmful intent within complex adversarial prompts. Existing defenses primarily rely on input perturbation or harmful-output suppression, but they rarely model where malicious intent resides, resulting in brittle protection and excessive ov...
Luo-Yu Chen, Wei-Qi Wang, Chen-Han Zhang et al.· 0 citations
Agentic LLMs with web search change the threat model for text anonymization: weak contextual cues can become cross-referenceable evidence for re-identification, yet those same details also carry downstream analytic value of the text. Existing defenses either remove explicit identifiers, perturb text for formal privacy,...
LLM agents increasingly screen tool outputs with small prompt-injection detectors, and teams choose among detectors by their scores on public benchmarks. We ask whether those scores predict how a detector behaves inside an agent. We replay the ground-truth tool calls of two agent benchmarks, AgentDojo and tau-bench, wi...
Security workflows need models that turn complex observations and explicit policies into decisions. System One models introduced by Jev return typed predictions and probabilities; security specialization supplies the domain expertise behind those predictions. We introduce SecJev, to our knowledge the first family of Je...
Zheng Chen, Fei Yu, Haohao Huang et al.· 0 citations
Within the $f$-DP framework, we derive a tight analysis of the trade-off function for Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) with subsampling based on random allocation in which each sample is independently assigned to exactly one of $M$ minibatches per epoch, each minibatch corresponding to one of...
Marten van Dijk, Murat Bilgehan Ertan· 0 citations