Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been extensively adopted to facilitate various security-critical applications. However, in stark contrast to well-established TEE technologies such as Intel SGX, AMD SEV, and ARM TrustZone, the adoption within the emerging RISC-V architecture has seen limited traction. Specifically, existing TEE implementations on current commercial RISC-V hardware face two primary constraints. On the one hand, most approaches rely on specific hardware extensions or software firmware, hindering their practicality on real platforms. On the other hand, the intrinsic limits of RISC-V’s Physical Memory Protection (PMP) registers, a key hardware mechanism to achieve memory isolation, have significantly restricted the scalability of these designs. To address the above limitations, in this paper, we introduce Lattice, a novel RISC-V TEE framework that enables scalable enclaves on commercial RISC-V platforms with a minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Firstly, for enhanced compatibility and portability, Lattice does not rely on any additional hardware extensions and proposes a non-intrusive Secure Monitor (SM) design for the underlying firmware. Secondly, to fully utilize the system’s available memory, Lattice leverages the Dynamic Physical Memory Permission (DPMP) design to enable the execution of enclaves with non-contiguous physical memory, and decouples the management of enclaves to minimize the size of the TCB. Finally, we evaluate the performance of Lattice under various workloads, including file system I/O, databases, web servers, large language models (LLMs), and different system loads. The experimental results indicate that Lattice achieves performance comparable to other TEE systems.
Yu Zhao, Jia-Bei He, Ming-Ru Xu et al.· ACM Transactions on Architec...· 0 citations
Cross-domain data flows are commonplace in regulated inter-organizational environments, where durable audit evidence must be retained without publicly exposing sensitive flow metadata. This paper presents a privacy-preserving on-chain attestation framework for recorded cross-domain data transfers in a permissioned setting. Its core data structure, termed GBFPlus, extends the Garbled Bloom Filter (GBF) with explicit occupancy indicators, constrained payloads that encode a consistency prefix and an adjacent-domain identifier, and distinct pairing-derived positions. Each domain administrator records observed inbound and outbound transfers in directional GBFPlus instances and periodically commits signed filter attestations to an append-only ledger. An authorized regulator can reconstruct candidate transfer edges from available bilateral attestations, while light clients verify ledger inclusion through Merkle proofs. A traceable anonymous attestation signature conceals the uploader’s cryptographic identity from ordinary ledger observers while retaining regulator-assisted accountability. The security analysis establishes integrity, conditional anonymity, traceability, and metadata-privacy properties for committed attestations under the stated trust assumptions, and the prototype evaluation reports the measured costs of GBFPlus and the signature operations.
Sihang Qin, Yang Zhou, Weiqi Dai et al.· Entropy· 0 citations
This work proposes MARS‐ITD (Multi‐Agent Real‐time System for Insider Threat Detection), which consists of a detection framework and an investigation framework that improves real‐time detection performance and interpretability but also provides a scalable, collaborative architecture for LLM‐based security analysis systems.
Kai Cheng, Dongkun Li, Weidong Tang et al.· Security and Privacy· 0 citations
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