Distributed adaptive resilient control for AC microgrids against false data injection attacks on state information

Abstract

In AC microgrids interconnected through a flexible DC system, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) targeting the control process of AC/DC converters may cause state deviations and even loss of synchronization among microgrids. To address these issues, this article proposes a distributed adaptive resilient restoration strategy. First, the FDIA mechanism model is established to characterize the effects of random and unbounded attack signals on distributed control. Second, a distributed secondary voltage and frequency control framework is developed based on consensus theory. The local adaptive compensation mechanism is further incorporated to enable coordinated correction and restoration of the voltage magnitude and frequency of AC microgrids. Finally, case studies are conducted on a multi-terminal AC system interconnected through a flexible DC network. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed strategy effectively suppresses FDIA-induced state deviations and limits cross-regional disturbance propagation. It also restores voltage and frequency to stable operating conditions in real time, thereby enhancing coordinated stability and cyber resilience under various FDIA scenarios.