Aug 2026· Human Affairs· 1 citation· 25 references
TL;DR
It is argued that both AI and bullshitters are untrustworthy informants, and for similar reasons, it is natural to describe AI’s informational outputs as bullshit, as it signals their distinctive kind of epistemic deficiencies, which they share with bullshit.
Abstract
Abstract A common charge levelled at the current wave of generative AI is that the informational outputs that it produces are bullshit. Drawing on the philosophical literature on bullshit, an examination is offered of the analogies and disanalogies between AI and bullshit. It is argued that there is a fundamental disanalogy between AI and bullshitting which ensures that, strictly speaking, AI’s informational outputs are not bullshit. Nonetheless, it is also argued that there are significant parallels between the nature and source of the epistemic deficiencies of both AI and bullshitting. In particular, it is argued that both AI and bullshitters are untrustworthy informants, and for similar reasons. We are thus in a position to explain why it is natural to describe AI’s informational outputs as bullshit, as it signals their distinctive kind of epistemic deficiencies, which they share with bullshit.
It is suggested that if the view is right, a certain type of moral risk can be averted since researchers are unlikely to stumble into accidentally creating AI models that are conscious, and a new form of AI risk that arises from the view.
Justin Tiehen, A. Tubert· Journal of Consciousness Stu...· 0 citations
The philosophical debate about bullshit has focused exclusively on what bullshitters say. In this paper, I suggest we should also pay attention to how they say what they say. In particular, we should look for what I propose to call highfalutin bullshit: the needless use of “big words” with manipulative intent, whether...
Background: Readers of Don Quixote have long divided between two verdicts: the knight is mad, or the knight is a martyr to a disenchanted world. Both readings assume that the truth of his acts lies inside the acts themselves; this paper argues that it lies in the world’s answer.
Methods: The paper develops pretension...
Sharad K.C.· NPRC Journal of Multidiscipl...· 0 citations
Our reliance on the new wave of generative AI has increased exponentially in the last few years, with little sign of abating. This raises the natural question of whether we should trust this technology as a source of information. Drawing on the epistemology of trust, it is argued that generative AI does not meet the co...
This review reads the book alongside the regulatory architecture being built on the same theory of agency: the EU AI Act, the harmonised standards beneath it, the UNESCO and OECD ethics frameworks above, and the November 2025 Digital Omnibus provisionally agreed upon in May 2026.
Arvin Obnasca· Journal of Ethics and Emergi...· 0 citations
Is the human predictable by AI, and if so, should we allow it? This paper examines the relationship between these empirical and normative questions from the perspective of the right to free development of personality enshrined in Art. 2 of the German Constitution. Based on an analysis of 50 decisions of the German Cons...
Unknown authors· Rechtsphilosophie· 0 citations
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