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Games Over Observation Spaces in Multi-Agent Capture the Flag

Sep 2026 · 0 citations · 23 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

A Double Oracle algorithm is proposed to find approximate empirical equilibria to solve this intractably large Capture the Flag game, and it is empirically validated that observation manipulation can improve the defense's performance.

Abstract

We consider a multi-agent Capture the Flag (CtF) scenario in a graph-based environment, where a team of attackers seeks to reach designated flag vertices while a defending team attempts to intercept them. In our setting, both teams operate using decentralized heuristic policies. While the attacking team may choose its heuristic from a diverse library of policies, the defense is restricted to playing a single fixed policy. To overcome this limitation, a centralized defense oracle strategically restricts the portion of the graph visible to each of its agents in order to elicit a wider range of emergent behaviors from its fixed policy. We formalize this interaction as a two-player zero-sum game, where the attacker reasons over its library of heuristics and the defense reasons over the combinatorial space of visibility profiles. To solve this intractably large game, we propose a Double Oracle algorithm to find approximate empirical equilibria, and we empirically validate that observation manipulation can improve the defense's performance.

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