Humans Disengage, Reasoning Models Persist: Separating Difficulty Registration from Deliberation Allocation

Abstract

Large reasoning models (LRMs) tend to produce longer reasoning traces for problems on which humans also spend more time. This correspondence suggests a shared sensitivity to difficulty, yet difficult problems can invite both persistence and withdrawal. We distinguish difficulty registration, expressed in which problems elicit more deliberation, from the allocation of further work. We examine their relation in matched human and LRM data from visual abstraction, intuitive physics, and relational reasoning. On visual abstraction, model trace length tracks the human ordering of problems by duration. After item identity is controlled, successful human attempts last longer than failed attempts, while failed LRM attempts have longer traces than successful ones in the pooled model analysis. The estimated outcome slopes follow the same pattern in intuitive physics. In relational reasoning, successful attempts are longer in separate human and model analyses. Fitting the two groups together with shared item effects yields a human-LRM difference in the relation between duration and outcome. Human grid actions connect longer attempts with sustained task engagement. Failed LRM traces contain more hedging or repetition after length is controlled, with the form of the difference varying across tasks. A resource-rational account explains how the expected reducibility of uncertainty and the value assigned to further computation can produce different patterns of persistence despite similar sensitivity to difficulty. Agreement about which problems require more deliberation can therefore coexist with different patterns of persistence on those problems.