It is shown that a one-line guardrail achieves large single-shot ASR reductions, up to roughly 40 points, at near-zero over-refusal cost, which overstates deployed robustness by a systematic and predictable margin.
Abstract
Trustworthy deployment of GUI agents in ubiquitous computing settings requires alignment that survives dynamic interaction and precise threat conditions, not just single-turn refusal of explicit harmful requests. We argue that prompt-level alignment, the dominant lightweight defense in current mobile agents, is a local phenomenon: it works reliably only in the narrow evaluation slice where it is typically measured, namely single-turn, explicitly-verbalized intent, and degrades systematically along two axes that any real user can traverse. Using a paired diagnostic on three frontier GUI agents, screen-grounded, user-side persuasion, with no environment injection, we show that a one-line guardrail achieves large single-shot ASR reductions, up to roughly 40 points, at near-zero over-refusal cost. Nevertheless, moving from independent probes to four-turn escalation chains raises guarded ASR by approximately 20 points on every model. Relative to the neutral baselines, this increase reflects substantial guardrail erosion for Qwen but a largely defense-orthogonal dynamic risk for Claude and GPT. The sign of the salience gap flips under the guardrail: concealed requests are not systematically more successful than explicit ones without a guardrail, but are more successful with one, indicating that the defense engages primarily when intent is named. Static single-turn ASR therefore overstates deployed robustness by a systematic and predictable margin.
ADeptS-Bench is introduced, a dual-stream trustworthiness benchmark, grounded in the ADEPTS capability framework and general population user studies, and reveals that all models overestimate consequence severity, mirroring the over-refusal bias observed in safety.
Joy Chen, Alejandro Castillejo Munoz, P. D'Oro et al.· 0 citations
PiSAs (Privacy in Shared Agentic systems), a benchmark for assessing unintentional leaks with dual CI annotations, enables direct measurement of cross-user spillage across agentic system components and interfaces, such as outputs, inter-agent communication, and memory.
Shubham Gupta, N. Sepahvand, Abhinav Kumar et al.· 0 citations
A current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective, and this result exposes a compositional safety gap.
Safety Sentry is instantiated, a lightweight guard model whose inference reduces to a single decoding call that outperforms a broad set of open-weight and frontier closed-source baselines on overall accuracy and safety-related recall, while controlling both directional error rates simultaneously.
This work studies the channel delivering search and page observations is a fragile security boundary and introduces Authority-Chain Hijack (ACH), an expert-refined strategy that turns isolated search-result and page-content manipulations into a coherent evidence chain across seemingly corroborating sources.
Xuebin Li, Han-Qing Zhao, Si-Yuan Liang et al.· 0 citations
This study cautions against transplanting verification into grounding pipelines and identifies calibrated abstention as a property worth preserving and proposes an abstention-aware verifier that intervenes only under sufficient candidate coverage and confidence.
Duchen Li· Poster Volume 0008 The 2026...· 0 citations
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