P-Hacking Should Not Make Us Abandon the Principle of Total Evidence

The tyranny of the p: when significance misleads

The p-value has long served as the standard of scientific significance, but its widespread misuse and misunderstanding continue to distort how we interpret data and publish findings. In this Comment, we take a critical look at the scientific overreliance on p-values in quantitative research. Through two illustrative ca...

Scientifically Unintelligible Phenomena

What use the Realist for a Theory of Truth?

Recently, Hasok Chang has argued that we should adopt a pragmatic account of truth on which truth is constituted by practical success. Central to his argument is the claim that truth in this sense can be pursued and that other senses of truth can’t be. In this paper, I present a dilemma for Chang’s view. Either pract...

First They Came for the Others: A Theory of Divide-and-Conquer

Divide-and-conquer tactics often succeed not through mechanical coordination failures, but through epistemic friction regarding an aggressor's underlying intent. When an attacker strikes a first target, bystanders must infer whether the assault represents a localized grievance or a systemic campaign. If the attack is r...

“Gaslighting” Refocused

I argue that all extant philosophical accounts of gaslighting overgenerate or undergenerate cases, either because they fail to include the internal felt experience of the gaslit or because they include this internal experience in the wrong way. I contend that some act A counts as gaslighting iff : (1) the gasligh...

“Please let me know whether it seems to you absurd or ridiculous to bring in necessity and contingency”

In this paper, we will discuss Wrinch’s reflections on logic at the intersection among logic, epistemology and metaphysics. We will see, first, how Wrinch was a Russellian philosopher and scientist, as she explicitly believed in Russell’s logical-analytic method and in the “all-important” role Russell saw for logic in...