Debunking doxastic morality with epistemic sociality

Abstract

Are beliefs subject to moral norms? Doxastic moralists argue that we can morally wrong others by what we believe about them – say, by holding racially prejudiced beliefs. Opponents argue that we cannot morally wrong others by holding beliefs: it only seems as if beliefs can wrong others because beliefs are connected to wrongful inquiry, attention, or assertion. Such debunking explanations face a problem: they cannot explain moralist intuitions concerning our accountability practices when there are no blameworthy actions in belief’s vicinity. I propose that this problem can be solved by appealing to epistemic accountability practices, such as epistemic blame and epistemic atonement. A belief can be epistemically blameworthy even if there was no blameworthy action in its vicinity; and this calls for practices of redress that resemble moral practices. In this way, endorsing our epistemic sociality – i.e., acknowledging how we hold each other epistemically accountable for beliefs – undermines a main motivation for moralizing beliefs.