Jul 2026· Anais do I Simpósio de Infraestrutura Digital/Nuvem para Pesquisa (Pesquisa@Nuvem 2026)· 0 citations· 15 references
TL;DR
An empirical benchmark evaluating whether LLMs and SLMs can generate security-compliant AWS Terraform configurations suggests that prompt design is a critical factor, highlighting the need for a proper pipeline for developing and validating LLM-assisted secure IaC generation.
Abstract
The widespread adoption of Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) has made cloud misconfiguration a critical security concern, while Large Language Models (LLMs) and Small Language Models (SLMs) have been redefining the programming process. We present an empirical benchmark evaluating whether LLMs and SLMs can generate security-compliant AWS Terraform configurations. Our automated pipeline integrates Checkov and Trivy into a GitLab CI/CD workflow across four Amazon S3 scenarios, evaluating six models under three prompt strategies of increasing security specificity. Security compliance improves consistently with prompt detail, though no model achieves full compliance in any configuration. Our findings suggest that prompt design is a critical factor, highlighting the need for a proper pipeline for developing and validating LLM-assisted secure IaC generation. All artifacts are publicly available.
A developer-centric perspective is adopted and three representative risk scenarios that commonly lead to security vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code are identified: Ambiguous Requirements, Under-Specified Operational Context, and Security--Functionality Conflict are identified.
Lixun Ma, Ruo-Long Ma, Bei Wang et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
This work systematically generates syntactic variants of security-relevant code generation prompts and evaluates their impact on code security across multiple open LLMs and programming languages, identifying prompt syntax as a concrete security control surface and providing actionable guidance for reducing vulnerabilit...
Matteo Cicalese, Antonio Della Porta, Stefano Lambiase et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
GenIaC-SecBench is introduced, a benchmark of 100 deployment scenarios stratified by architectural complexity, evaluated across 12 model configurations from four vendors, producing 1,196 IaC artifacts scanned by three independent policy engines (Checkov, Trivy, KICS).
It is proved that current AI coding assistants do not produce secure-by-default applications, dictating that enterprise deployments must transition from single-shot prompt engineering to continuous, standards-driven verification pipelines.
This tutorial introduces a reusable, end-to-end evaluation pipeline grounded in empirical software engineering practices, focusing on post-generation validation rather than prompt design, allowing for validating AI-generated code in modern development workflows.
The risk is not tied to any particular model but rather to the task category, and organizations should ask not which tool to trust, but instead whether LLM-generated automation code should be deployed without review.
Shanna M. Kahn, John D. Hastings· arXiv.org· 0 citations
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