Model Confidence Under Answer-Preserving Attacks: An Informativeness-Manipulability Frontier

Abstract

Deployed vision-language systems often gate their answers on confidence, making confidence robustness relevant to oversight. We study confidence readouts under white-box, image-only attacks constrained to preserve the generated answer byte-identically. Under a reachability assumption, an unmovable readout cannot outperform the answer-string accuracy prior, whose pooled value is 0.617. Independently of that assumption, a uniform amplitude certificate below a measurable threshold guarantees adversarial discrimination above the same floor. Across four vision-language models, three visual question answering benchmarks, five deployed confidence channels and two defense estimators, direct or surrogate-aimed attacks produce itemwise feasible perturbations that refute this uniform certificate in all 84 estimator-by-cell combinations. Coordinated correctness-label-aware attacks drive adversarial discrimination to or below the answer-string floor in all sixty deployed-channel cells, including all fifty-nine that begin above it. Hidden-state interventions and an open-ended text-model activation-space replication show that comparable confidence movement can be induced at the representation level rather than only through adversarial images. None of four tested defense families establishes a robust alternative under the specific evaluation applied to it. In a confidence-gated simulation, a coordinated token-probability attack transferred to a hidden-state gate causes up to 84.8% of previously rejected wrong answers to become accepted. After reweighting to each benchmark's natural correctness prevalence, accepted accuracy falls below the no-gate baseline in eight of twelve cells under transfer and all twelve under a direct gate-aimed attack. Under the studied threat model and budget, confidence is therefore an integrity-sensitive rather than intrinsically robust oversight signal.