This work argues that privacy cost, the information leakage borne by each group, is itself a form of harm, and adopts a compensatory-fairness framework in which a group that involuntarily bears greater privacy exposure is owed proportionally greater benefit from the system.
Abstract
Differential privacy (DP) is increasingly deployed to limit membership inference risk in machine-learning systems. Prior work has shown that DP-SGD can widen accuracy disparities across demographic groups, but this framing treats fairness as a purely outcome-side concern. We argue that privacy cost, the information leakage borne by each group, is itself a form of harm, and adopt a compensatory-fairness framework in which a group that involuntarily bears greater privacy exposure is owed proportionally greater benefit from the system. From this principle we derive the \emph{Privacy-Cost Equity Ratio} (PCER), a group fairness metric defined as a group's positive prediction rate normalized by its per-group overfitting gap. By a standard membership inference bound, this overfitting gap upper-bounds each group's vulnerability to inference attacks, making PCER a conservative measure of benefit relative to exposure. PCER needs only per-group train and test accuracy (no shadow models), making it a practical post-hoc audit tool. We evaluate PCER alongside standard fairness metrics across six benchmark--attribute combinations spanning tabular and NLP domains, under DP-SGD at a range of privacy budgets, and validate the overfitting-gap proxy against a direct threshold membership-inference attack. The results reveal patterns that outcome-based metrics miss. On COMPAS, PCER uncovers a persistent double disadvantage: the protected group bears both greater privacy exposure and worse predictive outcomes, something demographic parity gap masks entirely. Sensitivity analysis shows very strong privacy guarantees collapse both groups'overfitting to a numerical floor, rendering exposure-based audits uninformative in that regime. Together, these findings show that fairness audits of privacy-preserving systems must account for who bears the cost of protection, not only who benefits from its outcomes.
It is demonstrated that while DP alone can degrade both utility and fairness, applying fairness interventions can partially restore equitable outcomes, and post-processing methods tend to provide more stable fairness–utility trade-offs across privacy budgets and synthesizers.
Vinícius Gabriel Angelozzi, Héber H. Arcolezi· Proceedings on Privacy Enhan...· 1 citation· ⚡1
The results demonstrate that fairness interventions do not uniformly increase privacy risk; their impact depends on model architecture, subgroup size, and mitigation strategy, and the first unified empirical framework to support such auditing in practice.
U. Suleymanov, Ilhama Novruzova, Khalid Mammadov et al.· European Symposium on Securi...· 0 citations
When a classifier is trained by actively choosing which examples to label, should its labeling budget depend on which notion of fairness it must satisfy? We answer this with the first information-theoretic lower bounds for group-fair active learning, and the answer is a sharp hierarchy across the three standard notions...
Chang Lu, Yizheng Zhao· Proceedings of the 32nd ACM...· 0 citations
Private Inference-Time Pessimism (PrivITP) is introduced, which combines $\chi^2$-regularized rejection sampling with a two-phase Gaussian mechanism, and achieves ex-post $(\epsilon,\delta)$-DP with a privacy cost independent of the number of responses, cleanly decouples the regularization parameter from the privacy pa...
I. Jain, Nandini Bhattad, Sayak Ray Chowdhury· 0 citations
It is shown, through a theoretical study of the dynamics and numerical experiments, that a finite privacy budget can outperform non-private estimation in the long term when the feedback loop between leakage and participation is sufficiently strong.
Uddalak Mukherjee, Edwige Cyffers, Y. Chevaleyre· 0 citations
An approach to interpreting and setting $\varepsilon$ is presented, in which the practitioner establishes bounds on the posterior odds that adversaries can learn sensitive information, and the practitioner converts these bounds to values of $\varepsilon$.
Ruwimal Y. Pathiraja, Jerome P. Reiter· 0 citations
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