Skip to content

Oblivious Probabilistic Outcome Logic: Verifying Probabilistic Programs with an Oblivious Adversary

Jul 2026 · arXiv.org · Vol abs/2607.16533 · 0 citations
Computer Science

TL;DR

This work introduces Oblivious Probabilistic Outcome Logic (opOL), a new logic for reasoning about probabilistic programs with nondeterminism controlled by an oblivious adversary that models adversarial choice as a resource and uses probabilistic independence to ensure that random outcomes are hidden from the adversary.

Abstract

In the context of probabilistic programs, an oblivious adversary resolves nondeterminism without seeing the outcomes of random draws. Obliviousness is a common assumption in online algorithms and distributed protocols, but the complex interaction between random draws and adversarial choices makes it challenging to reason about correctness. While there has been significant progress toward reasoning about programs that combine randomization with nondeterminism, most of the work has focused on the adaptive model, whose omniscient view of program state is too powerful to establish correctness for certain classes of programs. We introduce Oblivious Probabilistic Outcome Logic (opOL), a new logic for reasoning about probabilistic programs with nondeterminism controlled by an oblivious adversary. Building on Outcome Logic and Probabilistic Separation Logic, opOL models adversarial choice as a resource and uses probabilistic independence to ensure that random outcomes are hidden from the adversary. The opOL proof system provides expressive and compositional rules for case analysis on both random and nondeterministic outcomes, and for proving almost-sure termination. Expressivity is tested through several case studies, including a paging algorithm and a leader election protocol. The opOL metatheory and case studies are mechanized in Lean 4.

View source

Similar papers

Preprint Aug 2026

Rational Dolev--Yao Attackers: Decidable Incentive-Aware Verification of Security Protocols in Strategic Logic

A rational Dolev--Yao attacker is introduced, a DY intruder whose actions carry costs and whose security-violating goals carry rewards, and a protocol is called rationally secure when no intruder strategy achieves a violation with strictly positive utility, expressed in a weighted fragment of ATL (WATL).

Ioana Boureanu, R. Ramanujam · 0 citations
Preprint Oct 2026

Robust and leakage-resilient device-independent oblivious transfer in MiniQCrypt

This work constructs device-independent (DI) oblivious transfer (OT) and bit commitment: honest parties use only trusted classical computation to operate untrusted quantum devices, which may share arbitrary entanglement and behave non-IID.

Zhi-Li Chen, Rahul Jain, Yao Zhang · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Interactive Proofs of Proximity for Model Evaluation

This formulation separates sampling the input distribution from querying the model and evaluating its output; distinguishes real audit data from generated data; distinguishes real audit data from generated data (chosen-randomness, or gray-box, access to the sampler); and allows the prover and verifier to use different...

G. Couteau, Nikolas Melissaris, Tamara Paris · 0 citations
#artificial intelligence Preprint Aug 2026

How to Verify Probabilistic Consistency of Predictive Models

The interactive PCP is constructed, which shows a protocol in which a polynomial-time verifier can verify the approximate consistency of (P,Q), and places l_2-approximate probabilistic consistency of explicit claims in NP, with certificates of length O(mn + log B) in the input bit-precision B.

Orr Paradise, Oliver E. Richardson, Y. Bengio et al. · 0 citations
Open access Sep 2026

An engineering reading of the bounded halting problem and observable properties of a universal machine

The halting problem asks whether a program eventually halts, with unrestricted resources. Engineering systems instead certify bounded halting: given a program, an input, and a step budget T, decide whether the program halts within T steps. This paper studies two of its uses. First, it defines an exact finite-budget pro...

Sergey I. Salishev · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Keyless secrecy against bounded adversaries

We introduce a keyless coding/cryptographic primitive that asks for two guarantees at once: the receiver is never fooled into accepting a message other than the one sent, and the adversary learns nothing about the message unless the receiver aborts. Neither the sender nor the receiver holds a secret key, and no computa...

Anne Broadbent, Upendra S. Kapshikar, Denis Rochette · 0 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.