This paper formulate this defense strategy as a coreset selection problem, giving rise to so-called anti-Backdoor Coreset Selection, and uses the Cumulative Entropy as selection criterion to further facilitate this effect.
Abstract
Recent training-time defenses against neural backdoors isolate a benign subset from poisoned training data, to learn a backdoor-free model from it. In this paper, we formulate this defense strategy as a coreset selection problem, giving rise to so-called"Anti-Backdoor Coreset Selection."Since poisonous samples have (a) lower prediction uncertainty and are (b) less frequent than benign samples, coreset selection naturally focuses more on samples associated with benign functionality than the backdoor functionality. We use the Cumulative Entropy as selection criterion to further facilitate this effect. The metric tracks the learning dynamics of training samples and allowing us to select benign samples with high informativeness for the coreset. Additionally, we unlearn the chosen samples in each epoch to facilitate the separability between benign and poisonous samples. Together, this yields an exceptionally effective training-time defense that constructs a benign coreset to train a backdoor-free model. Unlike prior defenses that compromise natural accuracy and fail against certain attacks, our method mitigates backdooring attacks consistently with a negligible impact on natural performance.
This work reveals that backdoor behaviors tend to be absorbed by a simpler parallel branch when jointly trained with the main network, and proposes Trapping and Removing (TR), a simple yet effective training-time defense that introduces a lightweight shortcut branch as a "honeypot" to trap backdoor knowledge.
Zixuan Zhu, Rui Wang, Lihua Jing et al.· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
DFCS is proposed, a training-free, trigger-agnostic method that clusters fixed pretrained features into one region per poisoning slot and selects the centroid-nearest sample from each region and supports distributional feature coverage as an effective selection principle for low-budget dirty-label backdoor attacks.
Yi Yang, Xiaoke Chen, Jin-Yang Huang et al.· 0 citations
Knowledge distillation enables an adversary to replicate a proprietary classifier by querying its prediction interface and training a surrogate on the returned probability vectors. Antidistillation sampling, proposed for large language models, counters this threat with an input-dependent, gradient-directed perturbation...
This paper designs a novel backdoor attack mechanism that incorporates multiple types of backdoor trigger, focusing on stealthiness and effectiveness, and proposes reducing the magnitude of each trigger type and combining them to achieve a strong backdoor relying on the combined trigger while still staying safely under...
Duc Anh Vu, Vuong Quoc Anh Pham, Le Hoang Nguyen et al.· IEEE Access· 0 citations
Mask2Keep (M2K), an attack-enhancement training framework that improves backdoor robustness under compression-oriented pruning by encouraging the model to encode both task- and backdoor-related information into parameters that are less likely to be removed, is proposed.
Jing Shang, Jian Wang, Kai-Lun Wang et al.· Neural Networks· 0 citations
FedRGD is a federated risk-guided dynamic defense framework that enables efficient fine-grained protection against backdoor attacks in non-IID environments, and combines feature inconsistency detection with lightweight masking and robust aggregation to achieve both accuracy and efficiency.
Rui-Ying Wang· Poster Volume 0008 The 2026...· 0 citations
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