Between Contextualism and Transcendentalism in Moral Theory

Abstract

Contextualist moral theory has been subject to critique for its overdependence on prevailing social practices, a reliance that risks engendering a form of circular reasoning. Critics argue that this approach neglects two crucial functions of moral theory. First, moral theory should interrogate current social practices, whereas contextualist theorists are dependent on these practices and may merely reflect them. Second, moral theory should instigate positive cultural change, but contextualism fails to provide a basis for such initiatives. These criticisms have led some theorists to turn to transcendentalism in moral theorizing. This paper aims to bridge the gap between contextualism and transcendentalism by highlighting the interconnectedness of the processes of discovery and invention in moral theorizing. If my arguments are persuasive, they show that the theorist is not entirely dependent on the status quo as a parasite, as transcendentalists often claim. Furthermore, contextualists’ claims that the role of the theorist is limited to extracting implicit principles from existing social practices are overly simplistic and fail to capture the full scope of their work. Thus, this study aims to show how moral theory can both reflect and shape social practices by providing a comprehensive insight into the intricate mechanism of moral theorization.