Aug 2026· IACR Communications in Cryptology· 0 citations· 31 references
TL;DR
This work presents the hybrid key establishment protocol TutaCrypt in a form that enables rigorous cryptographic analysis and defines two Bellare–Rogaway-style security models that precisely characterize the provided security guarantees.
Abstract
In this work, we study the hybrid key establishment protocol TutaCrypt as a concrete case of post-quantum cryptographic migration in practice. The protocol was developed by the end-to-end encrypted email provider Tuta and has been deployed to more than ten million users worldwide. We present the protocol in a form that enables rigorous cryptographic analysis and define two Bellare–Rogaway-style security models that precisely characterize the provided security guarantees. The two models capture that the security properties achieved in the pre-quantum setting are slightly stronger than in the post-quantum setting. We then give reduction-based security proofs that clarify under which assumptions the construction achieves security, and how its guarantees degrade if either the classical or the post-quantum component is compromised.
Our results illustrate how formally grounded cryptographic models can capture real-world migration strategies and hybrid deployments. Such analyses help to understand the security properties of deployed cryptographic systems and help move cryptographic migration from best practice toward principled, verifiable design.
KEMTLCP is proposed, a post-quantum secure variant of TLCP that leverages key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) for both key exchange and authentication while preserving TLCP’s architectural principles through a novel explicit authentication mechanism.
Hongbo Liu, Jingnan He, Jia-ao Ge et al.· Cybersecurity· 0 citations
A hybrid key exchange protocol combining DHKE with Learning With Errors (LWE), a lattice-based post-quantum primitive that provides authentication via a Public Key Infrastructure together with CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature, resilience against MITM attacks, and robustness against classical and quantum threats.
A. K. M. Fakhrul Hossain, Article Info· 0 citations
The first formal security analysis of the cryptographic core of Olvid, an end-to-end encrypted messaging app notably used by French government officials, including ministers, shows that Olvid is not secure in modern security models such as eCK and reveals a potential timing leakage.
Noemi Terzo, C. Cremers, Ruben Gonzalez et al.· IACR Cryptology ePrint Archi...· 0 citations
It is proved that the three most prominent variants of Privacy Pass are anamorphic, which makes it insecure in a model where user's device or client application is working against them and can also be used to achieve a private metadata-like functionality.
Mirosław Kutyłowski, Oliwer Sobolewski· Proceedings on Privacy Enhan...· 0 citations
The full protocol is described, game-based security arguments under an explicit adversarial model are provided, analytic cost estimates for the friction mechanism are given, the denial-of-service surface and a two-layer mitigation strategy are analysed, and a post-quantum extension is specified using hybrid X25519/ML-K...
Victoria Mellor, Mo Adda, Fahad Ahmad· Electronics· 0 citations
The review argues that readiness depends on protocol binding, implementation behavior, monitoring, and governance as much as on algorithm strength, and develops a deployment-readiness framework with four layers: security continuity, protocol integration, operational observability, and crypto-agility.
Yan Zhang· Applied and Computational En...· 0 citations
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