Jun 2026· Collection Information technology and security· Vol 14, pp. 235-252· 0 citations
Abstract
This paper addresses the applied problem of prioritizing security controls for national critical infrastructure under state‑level threats and severe resource constraints. We use the Analytic Network Process (ANP) to explicitly model nonlinear interdependencies and feedback loops in the system “controls–evaluation criteria–threat vectors–constraints”. A 20‑node ANP model is constructed with four clusters: security controls (7 alternatives), evaluation criteria (5), threat vectors (5), and constraints (3). The main novelty is an expert‑elicitation workflow based on “virtual experts”. Seven role personas (e.g., ICS engineer, SOC lead, CISO) are instantiated using large language models (LLMs) and used to produce the pairwise judgments required by ANP. The judgments are aggregated with the geometric mean. The resulting inputs demonstrate high consistency (mean Saaty consistency ratio ≈0.006; mean Koczkodaj index ≈0.034), enabling reliable synthesis of the limit supermatrix and global priorities. The final ranking assigns the highest priorities to Network Monitoring and Anomaly Detection (0.1948) and Network Segmentation / Unidirectional Gateways (0.1832), followed by Identity & Privileged Access Management (0.1623), Supply‑Chain Security with SBOM and code signing (0.1354), and Incident Response readiness (0.1342). The lowest priority in the considered scenario is Physical Hardening (0.0659). Robustness is confirmed by a leave‑one‑expert‑out (LOEO) analysis and by Monte‑Carlo perturbation (1000 trials), which yield stable rankings. Practical usefulness is illustrated with a portfolio selection model under a $10.2M budget, where a submodular knapsack heuristic selects {Monitoring, Identity, Incident Response, Supply Chain} as the highest‑value bundle for threat coverage.
A conceptual model and methodological framework are proposed for embedding data from vulnerability databases into ISMS processes in alignment with ISO/IEC 27001/27002 and NIST recommendations, and provides methodological and architectural foundations for implementing integrated vulnerability management and enhancing cy...
V. Yashchuk, A. Ivanusa, N. Maslova et al.· International Joint Conferen...· 1 citation
A systematic evaluation framework for LLM-driven threat modelling tools to support tool selection, observing the general LLM-integration, governance risks, and allowing for comparison of tool output is introduced.
Josephine Bakka, A. Brandhøj, T. Bøgedal et al.· International Conference on...· 0 citations
The findings show that LLMs can approximate structured cybersecurity reasoning under controlled representations, but do not apply it robustly, which has important implications for the design and evaluation of AI-assisted security decision-support systems.
A lifecycle model for LLM systems is proposed that supports security analysis by structuring it around security-relevant boundaries rather than workflow optimisation, and is supported by a 12-stage LLMOps pillar and a 9-category governance pillar.
Eleftherios Batzolis, George Drosatos, V. Katsouros et al.· ARES· 0 citations
What the results imply for how such orchestrators should be evaluated are discussed, and the study uses a single benchmark, the fixes were tuned on the same challenges they were evaluated on, and the client effect is demonstrated for one model only, so its generality to other models remains a hypothesis.
Romain Gerard, Assmaa Zeghaider, Yan Guo· 0 citations
Large Language Models (LLMs) are now deployed at an unprecedented scale across many critical sectors, rapidly transitioning from experimental AI tools to embedded components of production software systems. This accelerated adoption, often enabled by low-code integrations, has lowered technical barriers while simultaneo...
Md Abdul Barek, Md Bajlur Rashid, A. K. I. Riad et al.· Annual International Compute...· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.