Aug 2026· 1 citation· ⚡ 1 influential· 53 references
Computer Science
TL;DR
Experiments show that BASIS maintains near-perfect injection detection while substantially reducing over-refusal on safe attack samples, especially under robust instruction templates.
Abstract
Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data. Existing detection methods only detect the presence of injection and refuse to respond upon detection, overlooking the fact that for many modern aligned models, well-crafted instructions can resist most injection attacks. This means that the injection robustness varies significantly across instructions and models. This leads to widespread unnecessary over-refusal: inputs containing injections that the model could have handled correctly are rejected incorrectly. To deal with this over-refusal issue, we propose BASIS (Robustness-Aware Prompt Injection Defense). This defense method uses the Attention Competition Ratio ($\rho$) as features to train two sparse linear probes: an existence probe and a breach probe. Both probes make defense decisions through cascaded gating, which does not require additional LLM inference. BASIS comprises three stages: injection existence detection, per-sample breach prediction, and instruction robustness assessment; the online cascade refuses only when the model would actually be compromised and thus avoids over-refusal on robust instructions. Experiments across four tasks and six open-source LLMs show that BASIS maintains near-perfect injection detection while substantially reducing over-refusal on safe attack samples, especially under robust instruction templates.
AEGIS (Adaptive Ensemble Guard for Injection Shielding) extracts instruction-sensitive projectors to identify malicious instructions and leverages a Unified Multi-Layer Consensus mechanism that aggregates topologically distinct signals across the network depth.
Jia-Hao Chen, Ruiping Yin, Xin-Feng Li et al.· 1 citation· ⚡1
A systematic review and structured descriptive synthesis of research on defenses against prompt-based attacks in language model and agent systems reveals trade-offs between security effectiveness, performance, and system complexity as well as major gaps in benchmarks, indirect attack coverage, and multi-agent evaluatio...
Sana Mourad, E. E. Abdallah, Mohammad Ababneh· Electronics· 0 citations
BERM is introduced, a lightweight framework that performs in-situ detection by modeling a host LLM’s internal representations extracted during prefill, adding negligible overhead and reducing incremental inference overhead to near-zero.
Maihao Guo, Chaoyang Zhao, Jin-Qiao Wang· Proceedings of the Thirty-Fi...· 0 citations
LLM-based code generation is now embedded in mission-critical pipelines, but defenses against vulnerable output remain post-hoc -- static analyzers, fine-tuned classifiers, or an LLM judge that screen completed code, ignoring the generating model's own internal state. We test a narrower, directly measurable question: w...
This study designs a comprehensive testbed and a layered defense, Spotlight-Guard, that combines spotlighting-based input isolation, an LLM detection-and-quarantine pipeline, and instruction integrity based on a Hash-based Message Authentication Code into a single framework, and it is evaluated jointly along two axes:...
Doygun Demirol, Murat Aydoğan· Applied Sciences· 0 citations
This paper presents a framework for evaluating prompt injection attacks against LLM-based log interpretation using log traces generated during real cyber attacks, and creates adversarial examples through generic injection generation, refinement, and attack-specific optimization.
Max Landauer, F. Skopik, Markus Wurzenberger et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
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