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PURPOSE: Poisoning Conflict Resolution in RAG via Proxy-Fact-Grounded Updates

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 42 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

PURPOSE is proposed, a strict black-box poisoning attack that reframes the injection as an update that minimizes conflict, rather than as a counter-claim, and identifies non-contradicting injection as a practical mode to enhance poisoning attack.

Abstract

In Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), post-retrieval conflict resolution arbitrates among noisy or contradictory retrieved passages. However, the robustness of this safeguard against knowledge poisoning has not been adequately studied. Existing black-box poisoning methods all assert the target answer in frontal contradiction with what the resolver treats as settled, the very signal these methods are built to detect. We propose PURPOSE, a strict black-box poisoning attack that reframes the injection as an update that minimizes conflict, rather than as a counter-claim.

Purpose

extracts query-related facts approximating the resolver's possible reference, then grounds a pivot event in them to keep the injection consistent with what the resolver might verify while steering the generator toward the target answer. Across three QA benchmarks, five generators, and three conflict-resolution methods,

Purpose

attains the highest attack success rate (ASR) in 35 of 45 settings and exceeds the strongest prior attack with +9.7 mean ASR points. These results show that our poisoning method is effective against conflict resolution in RAG and identify non-contradicting injection as a practical mode to enhance poisoning attack.

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