Skip to content
Open access

DT-GenShield: A Digital Twin-Driven Runtime Security Architecture for Protecting Large Language Models Against Indirect Prompt Injection

Aug 2026 · Electronics · 0 citations · 22 references

TL;DR

DT-GenShield, a Digital Twin-driven runtime security architecture that integrates semantic threat detection, operational state representation, policy-guided mediation, and runtime logging to protect LLM-based systems before model inference, is proposed.

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in security-critical applications but remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks that cannot be fully addressed by conventional prompt detection techniques. This paper proposes DT-GenShield, a Digital Twin-driven runtime security architecture that integrates semantic threat detection, operational state representation, policy-guided mediation, and runtime logging to protect LLM-based systems before model inference. The proposed architecture was evaluated using the LLMail-Inject, BIPIA, and LLM-PIEval benchmarks under matched baseline and DT-mediated execution. Experimental results across the LLMail-Inject, BIPIA, and LLM-PIEval benchmarks demonstrate consistent improvements in runtime protection under the evaluated experimental settings. On the LLMail-Inject benchmark, DT-GenShield reduced the Attack Success Rate (ASR) from 9.50% to 5.50%, corresponding to a relative reduction of 42.11%, while additional validation on the BIPIA benchmark confirmed effective suppression of malicious prompt propagation with minimal impact on legitimate requests. These findings demonstrate that Digital Twin-driven runtime mediation extends prompt injection defense beyond standalone detection and provides an effective architecture for securing LLM-based systems against emerging semantic attacks.

Read PDF

Similar papers

Conference Jul 2026

IDE-Sanitizer: A Prompt-Injection Cryptographic Context Guard for IDE Copilots

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Integrated Development Environments (IDEs) introduces a critical vulnerability to indirect Prompt Injection Attacks (PIAs). State-of-the-art coding models, such as Qwen-2.5-Coder, often embed malicious payloads within project configuration rules, resulting in alarmin...

E. Nkoro, Weixian Liao, Cheng Qian et al. · 0 citations
Conference Open access 2026

Large Language Model Vulnerabilities

: Large language models are increasingly being deployed in safety-critical domains, yet remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety alignments. This systematic review synthesizes empirical jailbreak research published between 2024 and 2025, using a PRISMA-guided search protocol, followed by BERTopic-b...

Meda Račaitytė, Hélder Bastos, R. Ribeiro et al. · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

Real-Time Detection and Mitigation of Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-Integrated Enterprise Systems

Large language models (LLMs) embedded in enterprise workflows cannot structurally distinguish legitimate instructions from adversarial ones in the same token stream, making prompt injection OWASP's top LLM risk for two consecutive editions a persistent threat across direct and indirect vectors. This paper presents Prom...

Fatimah Alhamzawi · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

Balancing Security and Performance in LLM Agents: Spotlight-Guard, a Layered Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection

This study designs a comprehensive testbed and a layered defense, Spotlight-Guard, that combines spotlighting-based input isolation, an LLM detection-and-quarantine pipeline, and instruction integrity based on a Hash-based Message Authentication Code into a single framework, and it is evaluated jointly along two axes:...

Doygun Demirol, Murat Aydoğan · 0 citations
Conference Jul 2026

Automated Generation of Microservice Authorization Tests Using Large Language Models

Microservice architectures are inherently plagued by "authorization blindspots"–divergent security policies across independent services that create undetectable downstream security drifts. As systems evolve, these invisible vulnerabilities leave applications highly susceptible to privilege escalation and catastrophic d...

Md Arfan Uddin, Shakthi Weerasinghe, Connor Wojtak et al. · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

SecureMCP: Policy-Enforced Defense Against Prompt Injection in LLM-Generated SQL for AIoT Databases

This paper proposes SecureMCP, a policy-enforced framework that integrates Role-Based Access Control with an MCP server to establish multi-layer defense for LLM-generated SQL execution, and evaluates filter performance—false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR))—separately from LLM generation quality.

Wonbae Kim, Hee-Kyong Yoo, Nammee Moon · 0 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.